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Abstract 
Public Service Media (PSM) online is a highly up to date topic. There is no 
clear consensus among researchers if Public Service Media should have a le-
gitimization online and if so to which extent. Some authors still demand for an 
extensive role of public service provision in the digital era whereas others either 
argue against PSM on the internet at all or assign them a restrictive and com-
plementing function at the most. The question has furthermore concerned the 
European Commission as well as several Member States for many years now. 
Public service broadcasters have been accused of distorting competition online 
– an area that up to then seemed to have worked being left to the market. 
Though the extension of public service providers towards the internet is legiti-
mized by the European Commission it seems appropriate to analyze if there is a 
true economic justification for having Public Service Media online and if so to 
which extent. This article contributes to enter into that question against the 
background that the traditional public service broadcasting system (i.e. televi-
sion and radio) is taken as given and unchangeable for the analysis. The paper 
thereby waives to repeat the fundamental discussion of pros and cons of public 
service provision and, instead, concentrates specifically on elaborating possible 
cross-media effects. 
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1. Introduction 
Public service broadcasting (PSB) has been existent in most European countries 
for many decades. The origin of PSB lies in times where frequencies for broad-
casting were scarce and a great risk of economic market failure was feared 
(Motta & Polo 1997: 295). Furthermore, broadcasting was regarded to be too 
important to be left to the market – due to its suggestive puissance (it is as-
sumed to have a greater impact than other media) and its contribution to democ-
ratic, social and cultural goals (Elstein 2000: 14; Syvertsen 2003: 158; Wentzel 
2002: 5f.). Since the 1980s Germany has a dual broadcasting system where 
public service broadcasters1 and commercial broadcasters exist side by side. 
However, the PSB system remained and still remains quite strong (Humphreys 
2008: 2, 4).2 With the emergence of the internet, public service broadcasters in 
Germany have meanwhile gone online as well. Since the financing of their 
internet presence is carried out solely by license fees and due to the develop-
ment of PSB’s online programs, the commercial sector in Germany has ad-
dressed many complaints to the European Commission, accusing public service 
broadcasters to distort competition online. For many years the question of 
PSB’s online activities within various EU Member States has concerned the 
European Commission. Consequently, the Commission has taken several ac-
tions on this topic.3 For Germany, in particular, the up to now biggest case has 
just been laid down in 2007 – making Germany responsible to undertake vari-
                                                          
1  Public Service Broadcasting in Germany thereby involves the governing body ARD [Arbeitsge-
meinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland] and its 
regional programs as well as the ZDF [Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen] (see also section 2.2). 
2  Next to the BBC the German public service broadcasters ARD and ZDF are regarded as the strong-
est ones in Europe (Betzel & Ward 2004: 59). 
3  Just recently, the Commission has adopted a new “Communication from the Commission on the 
application of State aid rules to Public Service Broadcasting”. The new Communication replaces the 
2001 Communication. It has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union in Octo-
ber 2009 (Broadcasting Communication 2009: C 257/14). This communication in particular copes 
with the funding of public service broadcasters and handles the questions to which extent the financ-
ing coincides with the exception rule regarding state aid in terms of services of general economic in-
terest (ibid.). 
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ous actions in order to be allowed to have public service media (PSM)4 online 
without violating the EC5 Treaty. The Twelfth Amendment of the Interstate 
Treaty on Broadcasting in Germany just came into effect in June 2009.6 
 
Though the extension of public service activities towards the internet is legiti-
mized by the European Commission it seems appropriate to analyze if there is a 
true economic justification for having Public Service Media online and if so to 
which extent. This paper contributes to enter into that question against the 
background that the traditional public service broadcasting system (i.e. televi-
sion and radio) is taken as given and unchangeable for the analysis. The paper 
thereby waives to repeat the fundamental discussion of pros and cons of public 
service provision and, instead, concentrates specifically on elaborating possible 
cross-media effects.  
 
The paper is built up as follows: Chapter 2 copes with the need for regulations 
on media markets and reviews the reasons for the exceptional position of 
broadcasting and in particular the public service broadcasting system in Ger-
many. Following, Chapter 3 deals with the recent developments regarding PSM 
online in Germany including the actions by Germany’s public service broad-
casters, the reactions by the commercial sector and subsequently the regulation 
actions taken by the European Commission. Chapter 4 forms the analysis of the 
need for public service media online. Chapter 5 subsequently concludes.7  
                                                          
4  According to the recommendation of the Council of Europe public service media is thereby re-
garded as being technology neutral meaning that services can be offered through various platforms 
(Aslama 2008: 2). 
5  European Community.  
6  Among other things it contains a clearer definition of the public service remit, the allowed activities 
for telemedia as well as it includes the newly introduced 3-step-test for new and modified telemedia 
(Rundfunkstaatsvertrag 2009). 
7  The following remark holds for the rest of the paper: the internet is a huge and diverse market. 
When this paper is talking about resulting competition effects on the internet due to the existence of 
PSM online the focus is on online news media sites and its providers. 
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2. Media Regulation and interventions in media  
markets 
2.1. The need for media policies 
Most media markets are regulated by the government. Within the European Un-
ion (EU) media policies can be found both, on the national level (e.g. Germany) 
and on the supranational EU level (Gambaro 2008: 6). As long as solely na-
tional interests are affected media policies are limited to national actions. How-
ever, as soon as the interests of the single market are affected8 policy actions 
would be undertaken by the European Union, more precisely the European 
Commission and within this the Directorate General (DG) for Competition that 
takes responsibility for competition issues (Harcourt 2005: 41-44). For many 
years national policy interests were especially concerned with cultural aspects 
and goals.9 The European Union, on the contrary, has taken its actions within 
media markets especially from an economic perspective.10 However, in recent 
years the European Commission included the peculiar characteristics of media 
markets (i.e. the interdependencies of economic and cultural aspects) making 
them different from other sectors. It is assumed that media on the one hand are 
crucial for society and furthermore that media and welfare of society are inter-
related to each other (Harrison & Woods 2001: 479). For this reason public in-
terest concerns as well as pluralism aspects complement the up to then purely 
economic approach within the decision making process (Dewenter & Haucap 
2009b: 5; Harcourt 2005: 45f., 57f.). With special regard to public service 
broadcasting this can, for example, be observed when taking a look at the Am-
                                                          
8  That is actions that conflict with the creation or maintenance of the single market. 
9  This is especially valid for the broadcasting industry (Harcourt 2005: 58; Nitsche 2001: 3). 
10  This has been done especially in consideration of the fact that the European Union was once estab-
lished to follow economic goals and to create one single market. The signing of the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957 initially created the European Economic Community (EEC) or ‘Common Market’ (Euro-
pean Union 2010, online). Nevertheless, EU policy makers realized that media plays an active role 
in enhancing pluralism and shaping views and opinions (Harrison & Woods 2001: 480). 
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sterdam Protocol (1997) or the Broadcasting Communication (2001) and 
(2009). 
 
In general media can be characterized by a dual media effect,11 that is media 
transfer information and knowledge while at the same time being a factor of 
building up public opinion (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 569; Wentzel 2002: 
2). This especially applies for news and political programs. However, also pro-
grams which on first sight seem to fulfill a purely entertaining function – pro-
viding entertainment is regarded as another function of mass media – can at 
second glance have an influence on building up public opinion as well (Beck 
2005: 5; Wentzel 2002: 2). According to van der Wurff (2007: 114) entertain-
ment programs can thereby accomplish information, news, and public opinion 
and culture functions. Nevertheless, the extent of regulation depends on the 
media type. Broadcasting markets, for example, are usually highly regulated – 
this applies to most countries within Europe (Hargreaves Heap 2005: 113f.; 
Trappel 2008: 314). Broadcasting is said to have a greater impact than other 
media and is furthermore consumed on a daily basis – either for entertainment 
or information (Syvertsen 2003: 158). The print media industry on the other 
hand is mainly left to the market. The first question is why media markets need 
to be regulated? Especially since government interventions usually cause high 
costs – both when establishing regulations and when monitoring them. Fur-
thermore, if applied too intensively where costs exceed benefits, regulations can 
even lead to government failure (Hoskins et al. 2004: 303f.). However, media 
plays an important role in our society. People spend a majority of their leisure 
time with different types of media. In Germany people were found to be using 
the media12 for an average of 574 minutes per day in 2009 (+9 minutes com-
pared to 2008) (see figure 1). Secondly, as stated earlier, media provides con-
tent that not only informs citizens but at the same time can impart knowledge 
and therefore shape public opinion (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 569). 
                                                          
11  Also referred to as the Medium Factor Hypothesis (Wentzel 2002: 2). 
12  Media in this term includes: television, radio, internet, newspapers, books, magazines, videos, sound 
recording media (BR-online 2010). 
 
11 
Within media studies scientist furthermore assign information a dual value 
(Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 10). On the one hand information has a private 
value for each consumer by providing him with information. On the other hand 
information also accounts for a public value which arises for the society in gen-
eral. 
 
Table 1. Media usage in Germany (in minutes per day) 
 
 
Source: BR-online 2010. 
 
Reasons for government interventions in media markets can be split up in an 
economic and a socio-political component (Gambaro 2008: 3). From a socio-
political perspective interventions occur due to the above mentioned impact that 
media can have on society. It is not only the aim to provide enough information 
(pluralism) but especially to make sure that the information is not biased (ibid. 
4). Interventions from an economic viewpoint on the other hand aim to promote 
competition and protect the consumer. Within the latter one, an essential goal is 
to prevent a possible market failure.  
Television      Radio         Internet           Newspaper    rec. medium   Book            Magazine        Video 
In total: 574 min/day 
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2.1.1. The economic perspective: government intervention for market 
failure reasons 
Reasons for a market failure to occur can be public goods, monopoly power, in-
formation asymmetries or externalities (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 4; Hoskins 
et al. 2004: 288). All these aspects can or could be observed (to some extent) on 
media markets as will be highlighted in the following. Hence, when the gov-
ernment imposes media policies it is the aim to ensure allocative efficiency; the 
optimal allocation of resources to produce goods and services (Hoskins et al. 
2004: 172, 288).13 However, when introducing government interventions the 
two-sidedness of media markets need to be thoroughly taken into account (see 
also chapters 3 and 4).14 Media companies serve two customer groups at the 
same time – the audience and the advertising side. These two market sides are 
distinct; however they influence each other (Dewenter 2006: 2). Hence, media 
behavior and market performance on all market sides need to be considered be-
fore introducing media policies (Gambaro 2008: 2). 
2.1.1.1. Public goods 
The media industry is often regarded as showing the characteristics of public 
goods which therefore need to be at least partly provided or complemented 
through public service media (Beck 2005: 12; Robinson et al. 2005: 107). Pub-
lic goods have two peculiar characteristics. First, these goods are characterized 
by non-rivalry and secondly they face non-exclusivity of consumption (Hoskins 
et al. 2004: 295, Ward 2006: 54). The latter characteristic means that for the 
seller of public goods it is not possible to exclude a person who is not willing to 
pay for it. Non-rivalry, on the other hand, refers to the fact that it is possible for 
more than one person to use the good simultaneously without disturbing or ex-
                                                          
13  Thereby it has to be critically highlighted that market failure facts do not automatically justify a pro-
vision by the state. Instead the government’s responsibility (should) lie in securing the financing. 
14  For further literature on multisided media markets please see Anderson & Gabszewicz (2006), 
Budzinski & Lindstädt (2009), Dewenter (2003), Dewenter (2006), Dewenter & Haucap (2009a), 
Lindstädt (2010). 
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cluding others. To illustrate with an example: when company A is selling a car 
it is possible to exclude all those people who are not willing to pay the sug-
gested price (excludability). Furthermore, when person B finally buys the car it 
is not possible for person C to buy the exact same car (rivalry). When looking at 
media markets, however, it is somehow different. Nevertheless, in this context 
we have to distinguish if we talk about media as a public good or the good in-
formation that is transmitted by the media. Media, as for example television, 
newspapers or the internet, are generally no public goods since only one of the 
two characteristics is fulfilled. That is, we face non-rivalry (people do not dis-
turb each other while watching television at the same time), however people 
can nowadays15 at least technically be excluded16 (e.g. excluding people from 
watching a television program through pay-TV) (Beyer & Beck 2008: 391f.). A 
private supply is possible through the emergence of conditional access (Arm-
strong & Weeds 2007: 115; Robinson et al. 2005: 107). Furthermore, with ad-
vertising financed media products users are charged indirectly or implicit inso-
far as they are made to watch adverts (Armstrong 2005: 284; Motta & Polo 
1997: 314). At most, the public good characteristics “non-excludability” and 
“non-rivalry” could apply to the actual content, information or even entertain-
ment (Beck 2005: 5-17; Beyer & Beck 2009: 77; Gambaro: 2008: 4). However, 
it depends on the type of information that is referred to – general or specialized 
information. The public good reasoning especially refers to general information 
                                                          
15  Broadcasting was for a long time regarded as a public good (Humphreys 1999: 24). The exclusion 
indeed was not always possible. In the early times of analogue broadcasting it was not or hardly 
possible to exclude consumers from watching a program they were not willed to pay for (Armstrong 
2005: 284; Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 14). During this time at most, it might have been possible to 
refer to broadcasting as a public good (Beyer & Beck 2009: 77f.) but not anymore in times of digi-
talization. 
16  However, even though the exclusion is technically possible it is often not practiced. An exclusion of 
people seems counterproductive due to the two-sidedness of media markets. On the online media 
market, for example, most of the content is provided for free. Most websites on the internet serve 
both groups – consumers and advertisers which are connected to each other through indirect net-
work externalities (Dewenter 2003: 2f.). Since advertisers appreciate as many consumers as possible 
the provider of a certain website (platform) has no incentive to exclude any consumers – especially 
due to the fact that advertising represents the main source of income for the platform. 
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like news that is distributed over the media.17 For example, the announcement 
of the new chancellor in Germany could be consumed simultaneously by a lot 
of people. Furthermore, citizens cannot be excluded to get this information – at 
least not for a long time. Since people talk about it, the news would be soon 
reaching people who have not yet read the newspaper or watched the news pro-
gram on television. Hence, this makes information often to be regarded as pub-
lic goods. Nevertheless, information is never provided alone. A medium to de-
liver any kind of content is needed. Thus, media companies do not solely pro-
vide information but offer a service to their customers.18 
 
When coping with public goods, the marginal costs to provide one more cus-
tomer with the good are zero; however, any new consumer receives a positive 
benefit out of any additional unit (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 6, 14; Ward 
2006: 57). If the marginal costs are zero, however, the efficient market price for 
the whole society would be zero as well. This in turn would mean that when 
pricing a good for zero, no fixed costs would be covered which makes it un-
profitable for a (profit-seeking) company to provide the good. Hence, a supply 
by the private sector would not take place as long as customers cannot be ex-
cluded from consumption. Consequently the market would fail. If, however, in-
formation is regarded a public good, the question has to be raised, why there are 
newspapers as well as quite a few existing news channels worldwide (e.g. 
CNN, N-TV, and N24) that do work? This would countersteer the market fail-
ure argument. Instead it is often argued with a non-desirable exclusion from 
news – e.g. due to the dual value of media (see also 2.1.2) or the greater impact 
compared to other media types – that let many countries decide that especially 
television programs should be provided over public service broadcasting or-
                                                          
17  Specialized information on the contrary does not fulfill the requirements of a public good. Here the 
market mechanism works and exclusion is desirable and possible. An example would be the provi-
sion of expert knowledge - only people willing to pay for this kind of information receive it. If tak-
ing entertainment information as another category of information exclusion is likewise desirable and 
possible. An example would be the first pictures of the new baby of a Hollywood star – just people 
who buy the magazine that is holding the exclusive rights would profit.  
18  The service includes the buying, editing, bundling and delivery of information (Beck 2005: 2). 
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ganizations (Syvertsen 2003: 158). Nevertheless, in this case we do not face 
economic market failure but rather a socially desirable decision. 
2.1.1.2. Concentration tendencies and monopoly power 
As stated in 2.1.1, the aim of media policy is to enable allocative efficiency. 
Usually media markets face high fixed costs and relatively low marginal costs – 
setting up the infrastructures is quite costly whereas the delivery of content af-
terwards is fairly inexpensive (Beck 2005: 26-33; Dewenter 2003: 4). This 
leads to cost efficiencies the higher the production gets since average costs can 
be reduced – also referred to as economies of scale. The same would hold for 
economies of scope – once content (e.g. news information) is produced it can 
easily and quite cheap be transmitted to other media types (Dewenter & Haucap 
2009b: 11). Both characteristics mostly favor monopolies or at least risk severe 
concentration tendencies. Especially in the broadcasting industry this resulted 
from high sunk costs and technological bottlenecks (Motta & Polo: 1997: 313). 
Monopolies usually do not enable allocative efficiency (Hoskins et al. 2004: 
300). It is actually the consumer who suffers since the monopolist often sets 
higher prices than in a competitive environment. Consequently some people 
(the ones who are not willing to pay the high price) get excluded from con-
sumption (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 4). Furthermore, market power on media 
markets is especially regarded quite severe since it might lead to decreasing 
pluralism.19 For these reasons monopolies could cause a market to fail. Conse-
quently, they are usually prevented or at least subject to high regulation. A tol-
eration of monopolies, however, could occur in the case of a natural monopoly. 
In this case economies of scale are so significant that only the monopolist can 
be productively efficient which would result in an advantage over a competitive 
situation (Hoskins et al. 2004: 301). In many EU countries, the broadcasting in-
dustry was regarded to be a natural monopoly (Donders & Pauwels 2008: 296). 
Frequencies were scarce and setting up an infrastructure in the broadcasting 
                                                          
19  Though there is no clear consensus which market form will lead to more pluralism. Please refer to a 
short literature review on the media bias discussion that is given in Lindstädt 2010: 77-79. 
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sector was connected with high fixed costs; the variable costs on the other hand 
were quite low if not even negligible (Beyer & Beck 2008: 393; Motta & Polo 
1997: 310). This favored the decision to accept just one provider. It seemed rea-
sonable to let one single provider – after setting up the expensive infrastructure 
– produce the content. The supplier (e.g. of a broadcasting channel) could re-
duce costs by producing more programs or minutes. In turn the consumer would 
also benefit as long as the producer lower its prices as well.  
 
Nevertheless, it has to be questioned if the natural monopoly argument still 
holds nowadays for the broadcasting sector or even the internet? In times of 
analogue broadcasting this might have held – meanwhile, however, the costs for 
setting up the infrastructure decreased significantly; this becomes more impor-
tant in the era of digital broadcasting (Armstrong & Weeds 2007: 117; Beyer & 
Carl 2008: 56). Furthermore, high fixed costs should never automatically le-
gitimize government intervention – they can also be observed in several other 
industries, which are subsequently left to market mechanism – an example even 
in the media industry could be newspapers which are without restriction of any 
kind left to the market though setting up the infrastructure is likewise connected 
with high fixed costs.20 Consequently, high fixed costs do not necessarily call 
for a governmental content offer. Economies of scope on the other hand indeed 
have an impact and are intensifying its impact in times of digitalization 
(Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 11; Hitchens 2006: 258). For example, once in-
formation has been collected and edited for the newspaper it can easily be trans-
ferred to other media types such as the internet. Nevertheless, the transforma-
tion is always connected with some costs – on the one hand it has to be adapted 
to the special requirements of the particular media type; on the other hand it has 
to be adapted insofar as to meet customer’s needs, for example for users. In ad-
dition to this, it is again doubted that just due to the existence of economies of 
scope a government intervention is needed. There exist plenty of other areas 
                                                          
20  Also the telecommunication sector was decided to be treated differently in the meaning of the regu-
lation of networks (Beyer & Beck 2008: 393).  
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(e.g. the whole entertainment industry) that would face the same phenomena 
and are anyhow not regulated by the government. 
 
Therefore, the question is what kind and extent of intervention would be appro-
priate – it is not certain that a public service provision – as on the broadcasting 
sector – would lead to the best results. Most countries meanwhile have dual 
broadcasting systems where private and public service broadcasters exist side 
by side. There exist a lot of private TV channels which support functioning 
competition that furthermore promote pluralism. Furthermore, the well func-
tioning of the print industry shows that media industries can very well be left to 
the market. Concentration tendencies or market dominance could indeed occur 
on media markets, nevertheless this account for all industries. It is true, that for 
the media industry in particular concentration tendencies could not only affect 
the economic well-being, it could furthermore harm pluralism – due to the con-
nection of competition and diversity of opinion (Doyle 2002: 30). However, it 
always has to be asked how much government intervention is really necessary. 
In order to avoid concentration tendencies, it could already be sufficient to have 
merger controls as helpful instruments instead of having a complete public ser-
vice instrument. 
2.1.1.3. Information asymmetries  
Another reason that could cause a market to fail is information asymmetries. In 
this case the media consumer has not the same information as the media pro-
ducer and therefore cannot judge the value of the product accurately (Beyer & 
Carl 2008: 57).21 This could lead to the situation that either the consumer is not 
consuming the good or service at all or – since the producer cannot convince 
the consumer of the product – the product is produced in a limited way or not 
even produced at all. With regard to media products it has to be considered that 
content is an experience good; the consumer cannot accurately judge the true 
                                                          
21  The vice versa situation would occur when the producer (supplier) has not the same information as 
the consumer – a situation that especially insurance companies have to struggle with.  
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value of information before consumption. As a consequence, he might not be 
willed to pay more for better quality since he does not know in advance if the 
quality is indeed better (adverse selection) – hence the results on the market are 
suboptimal (less or worse quality) due to asymmetric information (Dewenter & 
Haucap 2009b: 19-21). This in turn could prevent media companies as the pro-
ducers of information to produce better quality or even induce better quality 
producers to exit the market.22  
 
The danger of this market failure argument, however, has to be lessened. First 
of all, information asymmetries occur in many, if not every industry, neverthe-
less not every industry is regulated as much as the media sector (Armstrong & 
Weeds 2007: 103). Secondly, in the media industry in particular competition as 
well as reputation helps to lessen information asymmetries (Beyer & Beck 
2009: 78f.). When facing competition media companies have no incentives to 
provide worse quality since consumers could easily switch to another competi-
tor. Reputation also plays a crucial role – media are usually not consumed once 
but on a regular basis. As soon as something is consumed frequently, media 
companies can and do built up reputation that solves or at least lessens the prob-
lem of information asymmetries (Beyer & Beck 2008: 392f.). Thirdly, consum-
ers do multihome, i.e. use different types of media (Lindstädt 2010: 70). All 
these aspects should nowadays apply to the majority of media industries and 
lessen the risk of asymmetric information. The print market faces intense com-
petition; this in turn makes reputation an important instrument to be successful 
on the market. Companies themselves will try to lessen information asymme-
tries to hold their good reputation. Also the broadcasting market in many coun-
tries developed from a monopolistic market structure to competition and multi-
homing should assumingly apply to all media types. Consequently, these as-
pects raise the question if there is still a true risk of market failure from this per-
spective that makes government intervention necessary. Armstrong and Weeds 
(2007: 116) put it as follows: according to them, the viewer sovereignty in the 
                                                          
22  The here described problem of information asymmetries and its consequences is also known as the 
lemon problem. It was initially described by Akerlof (1970) with regard to used car markets. 
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digital world removes the market failure arguments – people get what they want 
to consume in the unregulated market. 
2.1.1.4. Externalities  
Externalities occur when an economic transaction does not solely affect the two 
involved transaction partners but also a third party (Hitchens 2006: 256). The 
externality can thereby either be a cost or a benefit; neither of it is considered 
by one of the initially involved parties (Hoskins et al. 2004: 290). In media 
markets these externalities are quite often observed since information is re-
garded to present a dual value as stated in section 2.1.1. On the one hand media 
have an effect directly on the person who is consuming the content. On the 
other hand the media good or more precisely the content then also has a second 
effect on the society. A violent television program, for example, could have a 
negative externality effect on society (here: 3. party) when resulting in a violent 
behavior by the audience (external cost). A certain educational program, on the 
contrary, for example if a person watches a particular program (and thereby 
learning about life-saving skills), could have a positive externality effect on the 
wider population (that person is probably capable of coping with a future emer-
gency situation) that the person did not consider when watching the program 
(Armstrong 2005: 289). Since – with externalities – the cost or benefit for the 
third parties is not considered, the consequence is that either too much or too 
less is produced or demanded (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 4). The aim of in-
troducing media policies is therefore to prevent market failure through both – 
encouraging the external benefits while limiting the external costs (Armstrong 
& Weeds 2007: 109). For encouraging external benefits introducing subsidies 
or standards could be options. Examples would be quotas on European program 
productions stated in Article 17 in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
(AVMSD) of the European Union (AVMSD 2010: 95/18).23 Limiting external 
costs could be reached by imposing certain fines or taxes or stating limits 
                                                          
23  The Audiovisual Media Service Directive introduced in December 2007 amended the Television 
without Frontiers Directive (European Commission 2008: 1; Gambaro 2008: 9). 
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(Hoskins et al. 2004: 293). An example would be the limitation of advertising 
and teleshopping to 20% per hour, stated in Article 23, 1 or the protection of 
minors stated in Article 27 (AVMSD 2010: 95/19).  
 
Nevertheless, the question has to be raised why actions to prevent possible 
market failure due to externalities are mainly taken for the audiovisual sector 
while the printed industry is left to market mechanism. The functioning of the 
print market let assume that the private sector is able to generate optimal results 
as well. The only existence of externalities should not automatically call for 
government intervention. In addition to this, even if government intervention 
seems reasonable the question is to which extent this should take place. With 
regard to the broadcasting sector, for example, it should not automatically result 
in a public broadcasting provision but instead in supporting certain programs 
with subsidies (Beyer & Beck 2009: 79). Furthermore, a crucial aspect in that 
discussion is that nowadays, in times of digitalization, it is possible that people 
avoid unappealing public service programs (Armstrong 2005: 284, 290). Hence, 
the question is if government intervention actually reaches the desired aim. The 
externality argument with special regard to PSM online will be furthermore dis-
cussed in section 4.5. 
2.1.2. Government intervention from a socio-political perspective 
In addition to economic arguments, government intervention could also be rea-
sonable due to socio-political reasons. Some industries are regarded to be “too 
important to be left to the market” (Sawers 2000: 33) especially due to its great 
influence on society in general and the individual citizen. Within the media in-
dustry this especially applied and still applies to the broadcasting market. Ac-
cording to Ward (2006: 54) television and radio platforms are socially, cultur-
ally and politically crucial to provide positive social objectives. The broadcast-
ing sector and within this especially the television sector is said to have a cer-
tain manipulative potential that is bigger than for example the one within the 
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print media sector; especially due to its broad effect,24 its suggestive puissance 
and its characteristic to be very much up to date (Frank & Meyerholt 2009: 
367). More precisely, in contrast to printed media, television combines visual 
elements with audio elements and can be updated more frequently than the 
newspaper. This is the reason why television in many countries is more se-
verely controlled than other media industries (Wentzel 2002: 5f). However, let 
us start to elaborate the socio-political reasons to intervene in media markets 
systematically. 
 
It was already stated earlier that media provides content that not only informs 
the citizens but at the same time can impart knowledge and therefore shape 
public opinion (dual effect of media) (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 569; 
Wentzel 2002: 2). Due to the dual value of media government intervention 
might be a helpful instrument to maximize these values. Concrete reasons to in-
tervene in the market could lie in the provision and promotion of media plural-
ism – especially diversity of opinion and cultural diversity (Budzinski 2009: 
357, Leurdijk 2007: 71) and to ensure freedom of expression (Nitsche 2001: 4). 
Another reason to intervene in media markets might be to ensure quality. The 
importance of quality again is closely connected to the dual effect of media. 
Hence government interventions aim to ensure positive results both for the in-
dividual and the society. In addition to this, government intervention might take 
place to prevent biased information that could occur, for example, through the 
influence of the advertising industry on the commercial media providers. That 
is because the majority of media companies are dependent on the advertising 
market as their main source of income. As soon as a big advertising client 
draws his adverts away it could seriously harm the media platform. It could 
therefore be tempting for a media operator online to not report in a negative 
way about a company that is simultaneously an important advertiser on his 
                                                          
24  The importance of the media type television is also shown in figure 1 that indicates that television is 
still the number one medium that is used by the German citizens with an average of 226 minutes per 
day. 
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website and therefore create biased information. Having public provision could 
prevent this bias.  
 
Within media markets government intervention is furthermore often introduced 
due to paternalistic reasons assuming a negative influence for the public when 
leaving this industry solely to market mechanisms (van Dijk et al. 2006: 252). 
This reason of intervention is also referred to as the merit good25 argument. It is 
assumed that these kinds of goods which are important for society cannot be 
provided by the market at all or just with the many difficulties (Moe 2009: 
190). The traditional concept thereby presumes that people in society do not 
know what is good for them and hence do not demand these kinds of goods 
from the market. According to the new concept of merit goods it is presumed 
that the people do know what is good for them, however for some reason they 
anyhow do not demand these goods (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 4f.). For this 
reason it is argued that people who know what is good for society (e.g. the gov-
ernment) first of all decide on classifying merit goods and subsequently offer 
the consumers those kinds of goods (public provision) for a reduced price 
(ibid.). However, the problematic aspect with merit goods is that it is often con-
nected with paternalism. Why should the government being authorized to de-
cide on what is good and what is bad? Why is it presumed that the consumer is 
not capable to decide on what is the best for him on his own? Furthermore, is it 
efficient to intervene in media markets by providing goods that the consumer 
should consume, but otherwise would not consume – especially with regard to 
the fact that the consumer cannot be forced to do so? This critic became even 
more important with the emergence of digitalization. Unappealing programs 
can nowadays easily be avoided by consumers; there is no way of forcing them 
to watch certain programs (Armstrong & Weeds 2007: 116f.).26  
 
                                                          
25  Examples for merit goods outside the media sector would be education, health care or cultural ac-
tivities (Hitchens 2006: 255). 
26  This could have been possible in times of analogue television where there was just a limited amount 
of programs and the influence of public service broadcasting channels was accordingly higher. 
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For this reason it is no astonishment that the merit good argument is not really 
accepted within the economic theory; it is rather a moral and normative ration-
ale (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 19; Moe 2009: 190). In addition to this, it has 
to be questioned if the above listed socio-political arguments require govern-
ment intervention and if so to which extend? At least it should be doubted that a 
public provision can bring out better results than imposing appropriate media 
policies for media markets. 
2.2. The exceptional position of the broadcasting industry – public ser-
vice broadcasting in Germany 
As in many EU countries, the broadcasting industry in Germany was regarded 
to be a natural monopoly that furthermore possessed the characteristics of a 
public good; a government intervention was regarded necessary to prevent mar-
ket failure (Beyer & Beck 2009: 82f.; Donders & Pauwels 2008: 296; van Dijk 
et al. 2006: 252). After World War II Germany established a public service 
broadcasting system, geared to the BBC model in the UK (Nitsche 2001: 42).27 
In 1950 the ARD was founded – the governing body of nine independent and 
also government free regional public broadcasting agencies – whose task is to 
organize and distribute radio and television programs (ARD online 2010a).28 
The first public television channel in the Federal Republic of Germany was in-
troduced in 1953 (Motta & Polo 1997: 303). In 1963 the ZDF – whose treaty 
was signed in December 1961 – started its program (ZDF online 2010). Up to 
the year 1984 the public service broadcasters in Germany had a monopoly posi-
                                                          
27  Due to the propaganda events during the “Third Reich” it was regarded of major importance to es-
tablish and independent broadcasting system for Germany (Nitsche 2001: 42). 
28  The nine regional public broadcasting agencies are the following: Bayerischer Rundfunk (BR), 
Hessischer Rundfunk (HR), Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (MDR), Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR), 
Radio Bremen (RB), Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg (RBB), Saarländischer Rundfunk (SR), Süd-
westrundfunk (SWR), Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR). 
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tion29 and were the only supplier of television and radio (Beyer & Carl 2008: 
53).  
 
Germany’s Broadcasting is acknowledged a certain importance within the 
communication process which is due to its special range of affects it has on the 
consumer; e.g. being suggestive, up to date and with a spread-effect. (Holznagel 
et al. 2009: 205; Schulz et al. 2008: 7). The freedom of broadcasting is even an-
chored in Article 5 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz).30 The excep-
tional position of the broadcasting system initially resulted from the existence 
of scarce frequencies and high entry costs for building up an infrastructure 
(ibid.). For this reason broadcasting in Germany was acknowledged a special 
position by the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) (Depypere & 
Tigchelaar 2004: 19; Holznagel et al. 2009: 205).31 The Constitutional Court 
furthermore stated that broadcasting as a medium and a factor of public opin-
ion32 has to be free of government influence as well as one-sided control and 
predominant power of opinion (Frank & Meyerholt 2009: 367). In general radio 
and television broadcasting in Germany lies in the competence of the Länder – 
they adopt acts which are coping with the financing and regime of broadcasting. 
These acts in turn comprise a number of treaties,33 however the most important 
one for this paper is the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsver-
                                                          
29  The term monopoly thereby embraces all public service broadcasters (the ARD, including its third 
programs and the ZDF) as one supplier in contrast to the commercial broadcasters. If taken sepa-
rately competition for audience between the public service broadcasters (e.g. ARD and ZDF) could 
indeed be observed.  
30  http://www.artikel5.de/  (05.07.2010). 
31  Other reasons for the crucial role of the Constitutional Court for broadcasting policy can be ex-
plained by Germany’s legalistic political culture but also the heavy burden of Germany’s past 
(Humpreys 2008: 5). 
32  This wording is also included in the remit of Public Service Broadcasting that is stated in §11 (1) of 
the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting. 
33  Interstate Treaty on the Broadcasting License Fee, Interstate Treaty on the Financing of Public Ser-
vice Broadcasting, ARD Staatsvertrag, ZDF Staatsvertrag, treaties applicable to the individual re-
gional broadcasters (European Commission 2007: 2). 
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trag)34 that applies to both, private and public broadcasters (European Commis-
sion 2007: 2). That is because in 1984 the monopolistic public service broad-
casting market was opened up and the first commercial competitors entered the 
market. From that time on Germany has a dual broadcasting system where pub-
lic service broadcasting and private broadcasting exist side by side (Nitsche 
2001: 42). While the latter one finance its program either over advertising or 
paid content (i.e. Pay-TV) the financing of the public service broadcasting is 
based on a dual system. According to §13 Rundfunkstaatsvertrag (RstV) the fi-
nancing takes place through both – license fees and advertising (as well as other 
revenues) (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag 2009: 11). The majority of revenues, how-
ever, result from license fee that every citizen has to pay who is (just) in posses-
sion of broadcasting equipment (Beyer & Carl 2008: 48; Nitsche 2001: 148).35 
In the period 2005-2008 84.3% of the income of the ARD was coming through 
license fees whereas for the ZDF the license fee accounted for 85.4% of the in-
come (KEF 2009: 28). Meanwhile the license fee has been changed to a media 
fee that also has to be paid by people without broadcasting equipment (radio 
and/or television) but in possession of an internet-connected computer (Jaku-
bowicz 2007: 41).36 In order to guarantee the existence as well as the further de-
velopment of PSB in Germany, §12 of the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting 
                                                          
34  The Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag ) in Germany forms the legal frame-
work for the tasks of the Public Service Broadcasting (Moe 2009: 198). Since 2007 – with the 9th 
Amendment of the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting – the official name was extended to „Staats-
vertrag für Rundfunk und Telemedien” [Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia] which 
highlights the inclusion of other forms of electronic media. In the short form, however, it is spoken 
of the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting. This will also be done throughout this paper.  
35  Especially since the emergence of commercial broadcasters the proportion of advertising of the 
revenue income from the public service broadcasters decreased (Humphreys 1999: 45f.; Humphreys 
2008: 19). 
36  From 2013 on, however, the license fee system will be fundamentally changed. In June 2010 the 
ministers of the Federal States agreed that from 2013 on every household will be obliged to pay the 
license fee of 17,98 Euro, regardless if possessing broadcasting equipment and regardless of the 
form and amount of technical devises. The decision will now be put into a Broadcasting license fee 
treaty that will come into effect from January 2013 on. (ARD online 2010b, FAZ.net online 2010; 
Tagesschau online 2010). 
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even contains a financing guarantee (Bestands- und Entwicklungsgarantie)37 
(European Commission 2007: 7; Humphreys 1999: 25).  
 
Though the commercial broadcasters and channels increased during the last 
decades the PSB system remained and still remains quite strong in Germany 
(Humphreys 2008: 2, 4). In May 2010 the public service broadcasting chan-
nels38 held a market share of 41.6% on the audience side (KEK online 2010). 
Quite often, however the question is raised if there is still a need for PSB? This 
debate intensified with the upcoming of digital broadcasting. The reason is that 
nowadays, in times of digital broadcasting, an intervention due to spectrum 
scarcity does not hold anymore (Armstrong 2005: 284; Elstein 2005: 68). Arm-
strong and Weeds (2007: 82) put it as follows: “…the rationale for public inter-
vention needs to be re-examined. Regulation that was appropriate to the earlier, 
analogue era may become unnecessary, and even undesirable, in the digital 
world”. Similarly, other arguments of market failure, for example the supposed 
public good character of broadcasting, are not applicable since it is not the 
broadcasting that can be regarded as a public good but at most information that 
is provided over the platform (e.g. television channel) (Beyer & Beck 2009: 
77). This is because an exclusion of people from a television program is at least 
technically possible39 (e.g. over pay TV), hence the two necessary conditions 
for a public good are not fulfilled. Furthermore, with an advertising financed 
program an exclusion of consumers would not even been intended by the media 
platform. The argument of information asymmetries resulting in a market fail-
ure also does not seem applicable since reputation and competition act as qual-
ity indicators (Beyer & Beck 2009: 78f.) and furthermore the majority of con-
sumers multihome (Dewenter & Haucap 2009a: 42; Lindstädt 2010: 70). So 
other arguments must hold that justify the continuity of the public service 
                                                          
37  This financing guarantee was decided by the Constitutional Court in their 6th Broadcasting decision 
in 1991 (Lucht 2009: 26).  
38  This includes ARD, ZDF, ARD III, 3sat, ARTE, KIKA, Phoenix (KEK online 2010). 
39  However, the argument of non-excludability had been applicable in the early years of broadcasting 
(Beyer & Beck 2009: 77). 
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broadcasting system in Germany.40 Over the years the existence of public ser-
vice broadcasting in Germany was subsequently justified and put in law by the 
Constitutional Court with the need for essential basic provision (Grundver-
sorgungsauftrag) of diversity of opinion, pluralism, program range, quality etc. 
that should be ensured by public service broadcasting (European Commission 
2007: 2, Humpreys 2008: 5). Nowadays it is argued that PSB has content obli-
gations (Funktionsauftrag) (Holznagel et al. 2009: 205f.). These obligations41 
can be understood as providing a form of content diversity ensuring objective 
and impartial reporting, for example with news (Nord 2009: 26). This still holds 
in times of digitalization and convergence (Holznagel et al. 2009: 206). Fur-
thermore, it is nowadays often argued that having a PSB system with a special 
credibility that is providing diversity and pluralism is also responsible for the 
little conditions that are demanded from the private broadcasting sector (Beyer 
& Carl 2008: 53; Moe 2009: 190; Trappel 2008: 314). 
 
This section should give an overview of the reasons for media policies in gen-
eral and for the traditional form of public service broadcasting in particular. 
Since it is the main aim of this paper to focus on public service broadcasting ac-
tivities online and their justification on the internet the rest of this paper will fo-
cus on the online market exclusively.  
                                                          
40  As it was stated in the introduction of this paper the main purpose is not to question the traditional 
form of public service broadcasting in general but to focus on the validation of public service media 
on the internet. However, the given arguments already point out the problem or challenge to find 
convincing arguments to uphold the public service system with the media sector in Germany. 
41  According to §11, 1 of the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag) the remit of 
public service broadcasting is the following: (1) Public service broadcasting must, by producing and 
broadcasting its programs, act as a medium and a factor in the process of shaping free individual and 
public opinion; thereby fulfilling democratic, social and cultural needs of the society. Within their 
programs public service broadcasting has to give a broad overview of international, European, na-
tional, and regional events in any essential area of life. By doing so they should encourage the inter-
national communication, the European integration and the social coherence on federal and state 
level. Their programs have to serve education, information, consulting and entertainment. They 
have to offer programs especially in the area of culture. Entertainment should be included in their 
remit as well. (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag 2009: 11f.; own translation). 
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3. Germany’s public service broadcasters on the inter-
net – recent developments 
3.1. The market development with the existence of PSM online 
3.1.1. The emergence of Germany’s public service providers online 
Public service broadcasters are legitimated to offer new media services in addi-
tion to their TV programs (European Commission 2007: 17).42 The Council 
Resolution from 1999 confirmed the importance of public service broadcasting 
with respect to social, democratic and cultural life in the European Union – 
thereby clearly not limiting it to traditional broadcasting platforms but empha-
sizing the variety of channels (Broadcasting Communication 2009: C 257/3).43 
Since the middle of the 1990s public service broadcasters in Germany have ex-
tended their traditional presence on television and radio towards the internet 
(Moe 2009: 189). The WDR, for example entered the internet in 1995, the ARD 
launched its website ard.de in 1996 (Moe 2008a: 228f.). The possibility for 
PSB to expand their activities towards the internet was initially legally set down 
in the 4th Amendment to the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting in 2000 (Euro-
pean Commission 2007: 3). This amendment made it possible to offer new me-
dia services that were offering primarily program-related content. In 2004 the 
7th Amendment to the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting lessened the formula-
tion, changing the allowance into program-related content (ibid.). 
 
Nowadays every public service broadcasting channel as well as every related 
radio channel has an online presence. These are on the one hand the nationwide 
channels ARD (ard.de), ZDF (zdf.de), Deutsche Welle (dw-world.de), Deutsch-
                                                          
42  Due to the principle of technology neutrality public service broadcasters are allowed to expand to 
new media insofar as all rules in place for television broadcasting are fulfilled (Trappel 2008: 319). 
43  The Council resolution states: “[…] broad public access, without discrimination and on the basis of 
equal opportunities, to various channels and services is a necessary precondition for fulfilling the 
special obligation of public service broadcasting […]” (Council Resolution 1999: C 30/1). 
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landradio (dradio.de). On the other hand there are the regional programs Nord-
deutscher Rundfunk (ndr.de), Westdeutscher Rundfunk (wdr.de), Mit-
teldeutscher Rundfunk (mdr.de), Bayrischer Rundfunk (br-online.de), Saar-
ländischer Rundfunk (sr-online), Südwestrundfunk (swr.de), Hessischer Rund-
funk (hr-online.de) and Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg (rbb-online.de). The re-
lated radio channels can usually be found through sub-sites of the above men-
tioned ones; furthermore Radio Bremen (radiobremen.de) exists online as well. 
In addition to this, the public service broadcasters offer special interest pro-
grams like Arte, Phoenix, 3sat and KI.KA – every one of them with an own 
online presence as well. Subsequently, some programs of the public service 
broadcasters have their own online presence which, for example, holds for the 
two most successful news programs of ARD and ZDF: Die Tagesschau (tagess-
chau.de) and HEUTE (heute.de).44  
 
With the entrance of public service broadcasters towards the internet the com-
mercial suppliers of online media45 within a short time faced an array of new 
competitors46 – all of them competing for the attention of users. The variety of 
the programs differs a lot. Nevertheless, during the last years more programs 
and applications were added. In the beginning, it was especially supporting ser-
vices that were put online, such as television program guides in order to com-
plement the traditional platforms radio and television. However, in the course 
of time, public service broadcasters expand their offer with new self-contained 
programs; thereby taking advantage of the special characteristics of the internet 
and including audio and video formats as well, for example for national news 
coverage (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 112). In addition to this, the program va-
riety ranges significantly – besides news and information chats, recipes and 
games can be found as well. Dewenter & Haucap (2009b: 99f.), in their study 
                                                          
44  For a detailed overview of content and distribution of public service websites please see KEF 2009: 
53-58. 
45  This includes traditional broadcasters and publishing houses with an online presence as well as pure 
internet players. 
46  Though not all websites were launched at the same time. 
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on the economic consequences of public service media programs online tried to 
classify these diverse offers in ten categories: 1.) Fictional audiovisual on de-
mand entertainment, 2.) General (inter)national information, 3.) Sports content, 
4.) Entertainment & Lifestyle, 5.) Economics and Financing, 6.) Regional and 
local news, 7.) Fictional entertainment for children, 8.) Content on cars and traf-
fic, 9.) Weather information, 10.) Travelling. 
 
Within the period from 2005-2008 public service broadcasters spent in total 
284.8 Mio. Euro for online activities (KEF 2009: 123). Thereby they exceeded 
their self-commitments of not spending more than 0.75% of their total spending 
for online activities (actual online quotes: ARD: 0.86%, ZDF: 0.94%) (ibid: 
257f.). For the period 2009-2012 the public service broadcasters waived their 
self commitment of limiting their online spending. Within this period, online 
spending will account for 491.58 Mio. Euro (ibid: 125-127). Compared to the 
former period public service broadcasters are significantly expanding their 
spending for online activities. 
3.1.2. How the internet changes the markets and the effects of PSM’s 
online presence on competition 
In general it can be stated that profound developments within digital technology 
and growing convergence changed the media landscape dramatically (Burri-
Nenova 2009: 1, 7). More precisely and to start with, the emergence of the 
commercial internet in the 1990s47 first of all intensified competition within the 
media industry. Up to then it was mainly the traditional mass media platforms 
television, radio and print media48 that competed among each other. With the 
internet each one of these types had another competitor to take into account. 
Growing competition is no new phenomena – newspapers as well as the radio 
had to deal with new arising competitors when for example the television en-
tered the market. With the internet, however, it was not only an extension of 
                                                          
47  The World Wide Web was released in 1991 for general usage. 
48  Printed media thereby contains magazines as well as newspapers. 
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competition; furthermore the computer and the internet led to a growth of con-
vergence. Formerly existing borders of media and media markets are diminish-
ing (van der Wurff: 2007: 111). Convergence in general means the coming to-
gether of formerly separated industries like information technology, telecom-
munication and media due to technological developments (Larouche 2001: 1; 
Gambaro 2004: 8). Media convergence in particular is the merging of formerly 
separated media markets like television, telecommunication, printed media and 
the internet (Beck 2005: 334). Therewith, it is possible to provide any content 
over one transmission medium (Syvertsen 2003: 160). More precisely, the new 
medium internet was suddenly able to combine the former times mostly sepa-
rated elements text, picture, audio and video altogether over one single media 
type.49 Larouche (2001: 4) referred to the internet as a converged network that – 
with the help of the most converged equipment computer – was able to deliver 
those kinds of services. This in turn means that convergence within the media 
industry not only led to a broadening of competition but furthermore led to a 
change of relevant markets. That is because competitors within one market sud-
denly compete with competitors from a second – formerly separated – market. 
The above mentioned traditional media types were earlier mostly separated 
from each other. Nevertheless, they have been in competition with each other to 
some extent. Consequently two forms of competition can be identified – inter-
media competition and intramedia competition (Chyi & Sylvie 1998: 4-12; 
Lindstädt 2009: 158f.). The term intermedia competition refers to the situation 
when, for example, news programs on television compete with news sections in 
the newspaper. On the other hand media companies always face intramedia 
competition – this is the competition within a certain media type. This would 
mean that in Germany for example the national newspaper Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung (FAZ) competes with the national newspaper Süddeutsche Zei-
tung or that the sport magazine Sport Bild is a close competitor to the sport 
                                                          
49  The new options possible with the online media can be subsumed through five features 1) digitality 
and ubiquity, i.e. universal ability with no time and space restrictions, 2) Immediacy, i.e. the absence 
of format-determined deadlines, 3) multimediality, 4) interactivity, 5) hypertextuality (Trappel 
2008: 316). 
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magazine Kicker. The intramedia competition usually consists of the closest 
competitors. However, depending on how narrow or wide the relevant market is 
defined intermedia competition plays a more or less important role. 
 
Consequently, the emergence of the internet first of all extended intermedia 
competition. That means, nowadays the media types television, radio, printed 
media and the internet50 are competing with each other – on the one hand for the 
attention of audience, on the other hand for advertising companies due to the 
two-sidedness of media markets. Depending on the genre (e.g. news, sport, en-
tertainment) that is looked at competition can be more or less intensive. The 
genre news on the internet, for example, strongly competes with the respective 
genre on other media types like newspaper or television. Here, intermedia com-
petition is apparently affected by the accessory of online media and increases 
the intensity of competition (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 108, 114). 
 
Secondly, and especially interesting for this analysis, intramedia competition 
within the online market intensifies rapidly. Within this new media type it is on 
the one hand new and pure internet players who provide homepages and content 
online – e.g. netzeitung.de as the first German newspaper that is only distrib-
uted online (Netzeitung online 2010). On the other hand traditional existing 
media providers entered the internet as well. That is, most of the publishing 
houses set up a website in addition to their existing printed newspaper or maga-
zine. Nowadays there are 661 newspapers51 with an online presence in Germany 
(BDZV online 2010). This does not yet include magazines or weekly newspa-
pers like FOCUS online, SPIEGEL online or ZEIT online. Furthermore, broad-
casters (radio and television suppliers) set up complementing homepages for 
their existing offline programs. Consequently, the internet led to the tendency 
that former separated markets are merging on the internet leading to direct 
competition – both on advertising and audience market (Depypere & Tigchelaar 
                                                          
50  Meanwhile the internet or more precise online media can be regarded as new and relevant mass me-
dia as well (Trappel 2008: 313).  
51  Though the extent as well as the content differs significantly. 
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2004: 20). As a result, former intermedia competitors offline were becoming in-
tramedia competitors online. 
 
These developments just described can especially be observed as the first steps 
of the commercial players on the internet where most of them either addition-
ally or newly entered the online market. Nowadays news portals play a signifi-
cant role (see also the appendix). The BITKOM published a top 20 list and 
stated that news portals in 2009 boomed as never before. Thereby the list in-
cludes websites of traditional newspapers, magazines and television programs. 
Interestingly even specialized websites – e.g. focusing on sports or computer is-
sues – are included. Spiegel Online (1,327 Mio. visits) and Bild.de (1,196 Mio. 
visits) hold the first two positions of the ranking far ahead of the following. 
They hold market shares of 20.33% respectively 18.32% whereas already Chip 
Online as number 3 of the ranking (564 Mio. visits) holds a market share of 
only 8.64%. Well known newspapers and magazines with a good reputation on 
the print market like Focus, Süddeutsche Zeitung, and FAZ only hold middle 
positions whereas ZEIT online and Handelsblatt.com are even situated at the 
end of the ranking (BITKOM online 2010). 
 
However, in the middle of the 1990s, public service broadcasters were entering 
the internet as well (see section 3.1.1). Consequently the up to then already in-
tense competition increased once more.52 According to Nielsen Online the 
unique user figures for the two main programs ard.de and zdf.de are quite im-
pressive. Whereas ZDF has about 3 million unique users per months ARD even 
reaches around 8 million unique users in the same time (Dewenter & Haucap 
2009b: 98). Compared to other well established platforms like SPIEGEL online 
(5.77 million unique users), faz.net (2.0 million unique users) and ZEIT online 
(1.64 million unique users) it gets quite obvious that the numbers of PSM sites 
                                                          
52  The program of public service broadcasting sites was and is quite diverse. Therefore, it is not the 
aim of this section to present a detailed market analysis and observe the relevant competitors who 
are affected but rather to look at the resulting competition effects in general. 
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are fairly high (AGOF53 2009, online). Regarding the visits public service media 
sites could reach the following figures in 2008:54 ARD online: 419 Mio. Visits, 
regional PSM websites: 437 Mio. visits; ZDF online (incl. Phoenix and 3Sat): 
393 Mio. visits (KEF 2009: 58f.). Compared to the figures of the commercial 
players in 2009 (see the appendix) the PSM websites would consequently rank 
at fourth place. Hence, the entrance of PSM websites on the internet in Ger-
many had quite a magnificent impact on the commercial sector – especially on 
the ones which already existed on the internet before the entrance of PSM.55  
 
When analyzing resulting competition effects online it is necessary to consider 
the special characteristics of media markets. It was already stated earlier that 
media markets in general and the internet in particular are multisided markets. 
The media platform (here: the provider of a certain website) serves two distinct 
demand sides simultaneously. This is the audience (here: users of the website) 
and the advertising industry that is advertising on the website. The distinct cus-
tomer groups in turn influence each other through indirect network externalities 
(Dewenter 2006: 2). Since commercial media platforms finance themselves – or 
at least can do so – both through the audience and the advertising side and due 
to the interdependencies of the market sides, resulting competition effects al-
ways need to be considered on both demand sides. 
 
The multi-sidedness of the internet market becomes clearer when first looking 
at the commercial sector. Here the companies on the internet need to finance 
their programs mainly through advertising revenues and a small portion of paid 
                                                          
53  Arbeitsgemeinschaft Online Forschung [Association for online research]. 
54  Unfortunately the KEF report does only provide figures until 2008. Newer figures were not avail-
able at the point where this paper was written.   
55  Whereas traditional public service broadcasters especially form close competitors to other broad-
casters offline, they affect online a much wider set of commercial suppliers (i.e. online newspapers 
or magazines, pure online players, and broadcasting providers). 
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content.56 Up to now, paid content is just rarely observed due to the low accep-
tance of users to pay for content. According to a survey of the Forsa Institute 
only 16% responded to be willed to pay for journalistic content (Reglitz 2009, 
online). Consequently, commercial providers online are highly dependent on 
advertising revenues. In a similar way this would apply for the traditional pub-
lic service broadcasters since those platforms in Germany have a dual financing 
system (advertising and license fees), though the main source of income is the 
license fee. However, when looking at public service media platforms online 
they are – according to the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting – not allowed to 
finance its online programs over advertising and hence fund everything over the 
obliged license fee (Beyer & Carl 2008: 48, 53; Rundfunkstaatsvertrag 2009). 
According to this, the question arises how the multi-sidedness of the internet 
market holds for PSM online that is solely financed over license fees? In fact, 
within PSM online we solely face one demand side – the user side. With regard 
to changing competition structures online – which include both commercial and 
public service sector – however both demand sides come into play and get af-
fected which will be shown in the following.  
 
In particular it is the aim of this section to observe how the competitive struc-
ture changed for commercial online media platforms with the entrance of public 
service providers. However, if websites like ard.de or zdf.de are solely financed 
over license fees, how can both demand sides of commercial online competitors 
be affected? Here it has to be considered that the user and the advertising side 
are distinct demand sides, nevertheless they are connected to each other through 
indirect network externalities which can be positive or negative (Dewenter & 
Haucap 2009a: 36). Like in any other media type (e.g. newspaper, television) 
the user side always exerts a positive externality on the advertising side 
(Dewenter 2007: 55). This is because companies who are placing advertising in 
                                                          
56  However, since providers on the internet from the early days on provided their content for free and 
due to the meanwhile intense competition the willingness to pay online for certain content (e.g. 
news content) is hardly existent (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 114). 
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media appreciate to reach a preferably large audience.57 Hence, the larger the 
number of participants that are on a certain website, the more attractive it gets 
for the advertising side to place their ads there. For the user side on the other 
hand the indirect externalities that the advertising side exerts on the user side 
are ambiguous – they can be positive or negative (Ferrando & Gabszewicz 
2003: 1f). As long as users like or even appreciate advertising (positive exter-
nality) they would profit from a larger number of advertisers as well. This 
means they would prefer the website of a provider with a large number of ad-
vertising due to getting helpful information, for example. However, if users re-
gard advertising as a nuisance the externality would be negative – the more ad-
vertising is aired on the corresponding website the fewer users would be willing 
to use it. Even though the question – if facing a positive or a negative external-
ity – cannot be answered in a lump sum the literature often assumes that adver-
tising on the internet causes in the majority of cases a more negative external-
ity58 then a positive one (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 571). Popup-banners 
on the internet, for example, have to be clicked away and disturb the user in 
what he was currently doing whereas advertising in newspaper can be more eas-
ily skipped over. 
 
With regard to the emergence of the PSM websites there is first of all an in-
crease in providers that compete for users. It was already stated in section 3.1.1 
that with the entrance of public service broadcasters on the internet suddenly an 
array of new competitors entered the market and competes with the existing 
commercial ones. Though some of the traditional broadcasting programs were 
only regionally aired (e.g. NDR, WDR, BR) these boundaries blurred on the 
internet. As long as users have internet access they can easily access those sites 
                                                          
57  However, this audience for sure has to be consistent with the target group (customers or at least po-
tential customers) to reach the superior goal of profit maximization.  
58  The same applies for television. 
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from all around the world.59 Since every person has just a limited amount of 
time per day to spend, hence also for media, every provider of online media 
competes for users’ attention (primary market). The newly entered providers 
(here: public service broadcasters) make this competition for attention more in-
tense. Consequently users (most probably) spread more over the internet and 
might move away from other commercial websites.60 This is the most obvious 
effect on the user side. Let us now turn to the advertising side (secondary mar-
ket): assuming positive externalities from the user on the advertising side this 
would result in a decrease of advertising spending for commercial websites. 
Fewer users make it less attractive for advertisers to stay with that particular 
platform they have advertised on until now. Although this does not result in ad-
vertisers moving to PSM sites,61 advertisers would move to websites with the 
most clicks and users – measured in unique users and page impressions. Conse-
quently, it would mostly be small providers – e.g. websites of smaller newspa-
pers or smaller online players – that suffer the most. This would mean that after 
competition was initially extended it could get reduced in the end leaving a 
small amount of big players plus public PSM providers online while the smaller 
providers are crowded out. Taking a second look from the advertiser side and 
assuming that advertisers exert a negative externality on the user side the exis-
tence of PSM could even draw users away from existing commercial websites. 
This would be due to the fact that users can consume content on PSM sites 
without any nuisance – in form of advertising – that they face on commercial 
websites. This would be a clear disadvantage for the commercial platforms 
since it is mostly the only or at least the most important source of income 
whereas the public sector solely finances its activities over the mentioned 
obliged license fees.  
 
                                                          
59  However, since the public service broadcasting sites are solely in German the worldwide presence 
mainly plays an essential role for German speaking countries or German speaking people abroad 
(Hills & Michalis 2000: 489). 
60  Though the mentioned multihoming of users should not be neglected. 
61  Since advertising is not allowed for PSM online as already stated earlier. 
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It is certain, that competition online has been quite intense for many years. With 
the emergence of public service media platforms online this situation has 
strengthened once more. Since – as stated earlier – every provider online com-
petes for audience and within the commercial sector additionally for advertisers 
it seems interesting how the reaction of the commercial sector has been once 
public service broadcasters had entered the online market and thereby directly 
affected the audience market as well as indirectly affected the advertising side. 
The reactions will be the issue in the following section.  
3.2. The Co-Evolution of the institutional framework 
3.2.1. Reactions by the commercial sector on the existence of PSM 
online 
In former years private broadcasting players in Germany but also in many other 
Member States oftentimes accused public service broadcasters to have an ad-
vantage over them within the traditional broadcasting sector (Betzel & Ward 
2004: 47f.; Michalis 2007: 4, 8). This holds especially for programs that are 
hardly different to the ones commercial suppliers offer (O’Hagan & Jennings 
2003: 53). The reason specifically lies in the fact that public service broadcast-
ers are mainly financed over license fees. The commercial sector one the other 
hand has to finance its program over advertising revenues and/or through pay 
TV. As a consequence the European Commission already in the 1990s faced 
various complaints from the private sector of different countries regarding the 
national financing of public service broadcasters (Harcourt 2005: 55). 
 
When public service broadcasters subsequently entered the online market, pri-
vate competitors were sending many complaints to the European Commission 
accusing public broadcasters to distort competition in an industry that up to then 
seemed to have worked being left to the market, i.e. to private providers 
(Depypere & Tigchelaar 2004: 20). Thereby, the majority of complaints came 
from non-broadcasting companies like publishing houses and new media com-
panies that had entered the online media market and felt to be facing a disad-
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vantage (ibid.). Most complaints have been sent to the European Commission 
since 2002.62 The complaints from German private suppliers were especially di-
rected to the form of financing of Germans PSB (European Commission 2007: 
1). In general private competitors were complaining about the unfair competi-
tive advantage public service broadcasters have in an area that should be better 
left to the market and accused them to overstep their public service remit 
(Humphreys 2008: 8, 12). In particular, the association VPRT,63 for example, 
accused public service broadcasters of the lack of transparency between public 
and commercially funded activities as well as of a cross-subsidization of e-
commerce offers through license fees (Moe 2009: 195). Due to the fact that 
public service broadcasters finance their online content exclusively over license 
fees whereas commercial competitors have to finance their programs either 
through charging the user, advertising, or both it was regarded as a form of dis-
crimination towards commercial competitors. For this reason, private media 
companies argued that license fees represent an illegal state aid that does not 
coincide with the rules of promoting a common market (Syvertsen 2003: 162). 
More precisely, it was argued that private media companies encounter a high 
pressure to find sources of income whereas the financing of the public service 
providers is guaranteed which in turn leads to an uncatchable advantage of 
competition for them. Due to the high amount of license fees private competi-
tors could not profit in the same way from digitalization as the public broad-
casters (Frank & Meyerholt 2009: 367f.). Furthermore, and closely going to-
gether with the argument of financing, was the accusation that public service 
broadcasters overstep their remit when entering online media (Trappel 2008: 
                                                          
62  This included among others an informal complaint against the financing of the online activities by 
public service broadcasters in October 2002. In April 2003 the VPRT sent a general complaint 
against the financing system of public service broadcasters. In March 2004 Kabel Baden-
Württemberg complained that PSB would distort competition through not charging market prices 
when providing the access to transmission facilities. In July, October and November 2004 further 
complaints were sent to the Commission criticizing both the acquisition and use of sports rights by 
public service broadcasters. (European Commission 2007: 18f.). 
63  Verband privater Rundfunk und Telemedien e.V. [Association of private broadcasting and teleme-
dia]. 
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318). In particular this applies for programs that do not differ from the ones al-
ready offered by the private sector (Moe 2009: 195). All in all, it was suspected 
that public service media could crowd out private players.  
3.2.2. Resulting actions by the European Commission  
It was already stated that complaints and accuses that PSB would distort com-
petition are no new issue (see section 3.2.1). The European Commission already 
published in 2001 its Communication on the application of state aid rules to 
public service broadcasting.64 This communication – leaned to the Amsterdam 
Protocol65 on the system of public broadcasting in the Member States – stated 
that as long as competition is not affected in a way that is contrary to the com-
mon market interest, the financing system should be left to the Member State; 
by doing so they furthermore admitted the importance of public service broad-
casting to maintain pluralism (Harcourt 2005: 56). The aim of the communica-
tion was to limit the case by case analysis by clarifying how state aid rules 
should be applied with regard to public service broadcasting (Michalis 2007: 5). 
Nevertheless, the communication should not exclude the possibility of case-by-
case-decisions in case of complaints from the private sector regarding the fi-
nancing of PSB (Harcourt 2005: 56). 
 
After the various complaints from the commercial sector regarding the activities 
by German public service broadcasters on the internet the European Commis-
sion therefore needed to take actions and started to examine if the common 
market interests might in fact be violated. They checked and analyzed the Ger-
man PSB system in more detail. As a consequence, the Commission concluded 
in March 2005 that Germany through its financing system of public service 
broadcasters was acting incompatible with the EC Treaty and thus opened a ma-
                                                          
64  This Communication was just amended in 2009. 
65  Interestingly enough the initiative of annexing this protocol to the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Am-
sterdam came from Germany The idea behind it was to maintain the Member States’ responsibility 
of defining remit and funding for public service Broadcasters (Nitsche 2001: 152). 
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jor inquiry (European Commission 2007: 1, 19, Humphreys 2008: 12). All to-
gether, the license fee funding, the unlimited state guarantee, and potentially the 
tax treatment of commercial activities of public service broadcasters was re-
garded to constitute State Aid that is generally prohibited according to Article 
87 (1) of the EC Treaty.66  
 
Concretely Article 87 (1) of the EC Treaty states the following: 
 
“Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Mem-
ber States, be incompatible with the common market”. 
 (EC Treaty 2006: 76) 
 
Basically the funding of public service broadcasters in any Member State 
within the European Union is regarded to constitute state aid that gives an un-
fair financial advantage to the public service broadcasters which in turn 
strengthens their position towards the private sector (European Commission 
2007: 40; Moe 2009: 193). However, in particular cases the usually prohibited 
state aid might be justified if it can be regarded as a service of general eco-
nomic interest. It is assumed that there are certain societal goals that could not 
adequately be reached with a pure market approach (Harrison & Woods 2001: 
488). This includes for example services like transport, energy or health ser-
vices which are regarded to be socially important; therefore everybody should 
have access to it (Moe 2008b: 309). The exception of services of general eco-
nomic interest is stated in Article 86 (2) of the EC Treaty: 
 
                                                          
66  However there exists an exception when state aid is regarded to be compatible with the Treaty. 
These exception is stated in Article 86 (2) of the EC Treaty (EC Treaty 2006). It thereby has to be 
ensured that the aid is not opposing internal market and competition rules of the EC Treaty 
(Michalis 2007: 2). 
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Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be 
subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on 
competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. 
The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would 
be contrary to the interests of the Community. (EC Treaty 2006: 76) 
 
However, in the Commission’s opinion the services that Germany’s public ser-
vice broadcasters were offering in the new media did not fulfill the conditions 
of a service of general economic interest (European Commission 2007: 50). In 
particular, the European Commission accused Germany of the following of-
fences: Firstly, the public service remit was regarded to not be defined suffi-
ciently enough.67 Secondly, the adequate entrustment of the public service remit 
was doubted with regard to new media services. Thirdly, and consequently the 
Commission also missed an effective control of the obligations of public ser-
vice broadcasters. By comprising purely commercial activities within the public 
service remit it could not be ensured that those activities do not benefit from 
state funding as well. Furthermore, the European Commission accused Ger-
many of lacking mechanisms which guarantee that only as much state funding 
is spent that is needed for fulfilling the public service remit. Last but not least, 
the Commission determines insufficient safeguards for the public service 
broadcasters’ commercial activities that are supposed to meet market principles.  
 
 (European Commission 2007: 19, 62f.) 
 
After the European Commission had sent the state aid accuse, Germany was au-
thorized to react and give its statement on this issue. The correspondence be-
tween the Commission and Germany continued for a certain time since Ger-
many was not agreeing on all accuses being made (European Commission 
                                                          
67  According to this, it was for example doubted in how far online games or chat rooms online can be 
subsumed under the public service remit (Moe 2009: 195). 
 
43 
2007: 20-27).68 Germany was for example not regarding the license fee to con-
stitute state aid and they considered their public service mission being defined 
precisely enough. In addition to Germany, it was also possible for the com-
plainants to send further observations to the European Commission before the 
Commission came to its final assessment also stating appropriate measures for 
the case to be closed down (ibid: 27-65). In order to ensure compatibility with 
the common market principles the European Commission proposed Germany to 
undertake actions for fulfilling the following measures: 1) Clear Definition of 
the public service remit as regards new media activities, 2) Entrustment and 
Control, 3) Proportionality, which includes separation of accounts, exclusion of 
overcompensation and cross subsidization of commercial activities, respect of 
market principles for purely commercial activities as well as safeguards against 
financing of sports rights which remain unused (ibid: 63-65).69 
3.2.3. Dispute resolution between the European Commission and Ger-
many  
The Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting was already amended several times, es-
pecially since new media services came up which were since the 9th Amend-
ment to the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting subsumed under the term teleme-
dia (European Commission 2007: 4f.). The last Amendment to the Treaty has 
just taken place in June 2009 (12th Amendment to the Interstate Treaty on 
Broadcasting) and was the result of the compromise between Germany and the 
European Commission regarding the state aid accuse discussed in the previous 
section. With this amendment the public financing of public service broadcast-
ers in Germany regarding their new audiovisual media services correspond to 
the EC State aid rules (Repa & Tosics 2009: 1). 
 
                                                          
68  A complete overview on all correspondence on this issue would go beyond the scope of this paper. 
Therefore please refer to European Commission (2007).  
69  The three mentioned aspects represent categories. These categories in turn contain exact measures 
that have to be undertaken by Germany which will be partly listed in section 3.2.3. 
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With regard to the European Commission’s accusation, Germany gave certain 
commitments concerning the financing system of public service broadcasters 
that were submitted in December 2006 to the Commission (Humphreys 2008: 
12). Thereupon, the European Commission submitted its letter with the accep-
tance of the commitments in April 2007. From that time on Germany was obli-
gated to submit the legal framework into action within two years in order to 
comply with the EC state aid rules regarding the financing of public service 
broadcasters (European Commission 2007: 79f.; Repa & Tosics 2009: 1). More 
precisely, Germany and the European Commission agreed on actions that 
needed to be undertaken in order to fulfill the Commission’s demand for 1) a 
clear definition of the public service remit as regards new media activities, 2) 
its entrustment and control as well as 3) its proportionality: The most important 
actions that affected the online activities are listed below. 70 
 
 Legislative provision for a further substantiation of the remit for “teleme-
dia” and additional digital offers according to binding criteria plus lay-
ing down criteria to trigger the evaluation procedure. Public service 
broadcasters further need to specify the criteria that trigger the evalua-
tion procedure and carry out the procedure. The mentioned procedure 
then ends with the examination and declaration by the Federal States 
(Länder) as part of their legal supervision. 
 
 Establishment of a 3-step-test as an evaluation procedure for all new or 
modified digital offers of public service broadcasters that is laid down by 
law. These three steps include: 
1) Evaluation if the offer is covered by the public service remit and 
serves the democratic, social and cultural needs of society. 
2) Evaluation if the offer contributes in a qualitative way to “editorial 
competition” (publizistischer Wettbewerb).  
                                                          
70  The agreed on measures for the online sector are listed shortly and are not complete. For a detailed 
and complete description please refer to European Commission 2007: 65-79. 
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3) Specifying the financial impact of the evaluated offer. 
 
 Thereby the term editorial competition will be further explained in the fu-
ture Interstate Treaty, taking existing freely available offers and the rele-
vant impact of the planned offer on the market into consideration.  
 
 Public service broadcasters will have to provide concrete explanations of 
their offers. This will be followed by and evaluation where the relevant 
supervision as well as third parties have the opportunity to evaluate the 
offer and give views on it. 
 
 Inclusion of telemedia activities within the new Interstate Treaty stating 
that they are covered by the public service remit. For doing so public ser-
vice broadcasters need to present an overall concept on media services in 
advance. 
 
 Existing telemedia activities which, after the new Interstate Treaty comes 
into action, are not meeting the newly introduced legal requirements and 
restrictions could not be offered by public service broadcasters. 
 
 Telemedia offers will be subject to the entrustment procedure (see 3-step 
test) for the further specification of the public service remit for telemedia.  
 
 The public service remit of telemedia will be limited to edited offers 
(journalistisch-redaktionelle Angebote). 
 
 Establishment of an illustrative list of telemedia services which would 
normally (not) be covered by the public service remit (positive/negative 
list). Thereby activities like e-commerce would therefore be part of the 
negative list since not being part of the public service remit. 
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 Inclusion of criteria which online offers need to serve in the Interstate 
Treaty.  
 
 The public service remit shall not cover local reporting. 
 
 Continued prohibition of sponsoring and advertisement for telemedia 
 
  (European Commission 2007: 65-79) 
 
These measures have been taken into the 12th Amendment to the Interstate 
Treaty on Broadcasting that came into effect on 1 June 2009. Within this, it is 
especially § 11 RStV. that is drastically affected and which was complemented 
by certain additional numeric (Rundfunkänderungsstaatsvertrag 2009: 2, 6-12). 
§11, for example, further specify the public service remit, §11d contains a fur-
ther explanation of the term telemedia and what it comprises. §11f eventually 
copes with the telemedia concepts and the 3-step test for new or modified tele-
media (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag 2009: 11-14).  
 
The question is if the stated measures are appropriate and how the interaction 
between private media operators and public service broadcasters on the internet 
will develop in the future. Generally the presence of public service broadcasters 
online is acknowledged – both by Germany as well as the European Commis-
sion. Nevertheless, the following chapter will now analyze if there is an eco-
nomic justification for public service media to operate online and if so to which 
extent this should take place.  
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4. An economic analysis of the justification for Public 
Service Media online 
4.1. Literature Review 
Public Service Media online is a highly up to date topic and many researchers 
already coped with this issue. There is no clear consensus among researchers if 
PSM should have a legitimization online and if so to which extent. Some au-
thors still demand for an extensive role of public service provision in the digital 
era whereas others either argue against PSM on the internet at all or assign them 
a restrictive and complementing function at the most. The following literature 
review will show that the different viewpoints mainly result from different ob-
jectives as well as different disciplinary backgrounds. Those authors who favor 
and support a continuous public service provision online mainly argue from a 
media scientific or sometimes media economic perspective and primarily aim 
for reaching societal and democratic goals. The authors that claim for a restric-
tive and complementing function at the most on the other hand mainly argue 
from a purely economic perspective and thereby predominantly follow eco-
nomic welfare goals. 
 
Many authors including Armstrong & Weeds (2007),71 Beyer & Beck (2008 & 
2009), Depypere & Tigchelaar (2004), Dewenter & Haucap (2009b), Donders 
& Pauwells (2008)72 argue that economic market failure arguments – once faced 
on the traditional broadcasting market – cannot be found anymore in the digital 
era and hence not on the internet. These authors consequently rather argue 
against a PSM role online. According to Depypere & Tigchelaar (2004), 
Dewenter & Haucap (2009b) and Rebmann (2003) the barriers of entry are low; 
competition is quite intense and hence favors pluralism. Beyer & Beck (2008 & 
2009) emphasize that no economic arguments exist that legitimize public ser-
                                                          
71  Though rather with a focus on digital broadcasting. 
72  Though rather with a focus on digital broadcasting.  
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vice media on the internet; they see merit good reasoning as the only plausible 
argument for having PSM online. Nevertheless, they argue against an endless 
financial extension of PSB activities and instead rather argue for a shift towards 
online at most. The mentioned authors claiming for restrictive roles of PSM 
agree that at the utmost, PSM online should concentrate on certain areas exclu-
sively if there is a need for it and thereby fulfilling a complementing function 
that does not distort competition.  
 
Other authors, however, assign PSM still a remaining and sometimes even 
strong rationale online. Some researchers thereby see certain market failure 
facts to be still existent on the internet. Jakubowicz (2007) regards market fail-
ure as a civic and culture issue und argues for PSM in order to counteract the 
trend of the undermining of social cohesion especially with regard to the inter-
net. Supporting this, Nord (2009) and Rüter (2002) argue for an existence of 
PSM online to attract an audience that is becoming more individualized, to 
reach previously difficult audiences and providing public orientation. Neverthe-
less, Nord thereby sees the possible problem of distortion of competition and a 
possible misusage of the dominant position of PSB whereas Rüter emphasizes 
the need for appropriate measures to ensure that no unproductive copying of 
commercial players takes place. Bardoel & Lowe (2007) argue for a demand-
driven PSM culture with an interactive society and see the need for PSM online 
to produce positive externalities, public value and subsequently also to counter 
fragmentation and creating social cohesion. Moe (2008a, 2008b, 2009)73 sub-
sumes the aspects participation, access and quality under the merit good argu-
ment. PSM online should have even more than just a complementing function 
which is also supported by Wiedemann (2004) who even regards a certain dis-
tortion of competition as unavoidable and tolerable. Nissen (2006) sees a new 
way of market failure through the lack of national and cultural diversity with 
only commercial providers and assigns PSM to fulfill educational obligations 
and to work against digital divide. Many other authors as well favor a remain-
                                                          
73  Based on an empirical analysis of PSB systems in Norway, Germany, and the UK. 
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ing rationale due to promoting (cultural) diversity, pluralism and quality, in-
cluding Aslama (2008), EBU (2008), Hills & Michalis (2000),74 Karppinen 
(2009), Leurdijk (2007), Murdock (2004), and Trappel (2008).75 According to 
van der Wurff (2007)76 markets – especially in areas of news and information – 
fail with regard to independence and quality. Consequently, PSM online is nec-
essary to compensate for market failure; nevertheless, he argues for a comple-
menting role with respect to services the market cannot or does not provide. In 
a similar direction, Frank & Meyerholt (2009) in their paper about Germany ar-
gue for an ongoing existence of PSM online. To their mind, it is not a lack of 
pluralism online but rather the reason to provide basic supply without political 
and economic influence. Nevertheless, the authors thereby see the need to work 
against the commercialization of PSM. 
 
To my best knowledge, no paper – dealing with Public Service Media online – 
however, up to now analyzed the question of the justification for PSM online 
against the background of the inevitable existence of the traditional PSB system 
(television and radio). It is the aim of this article to fill this gap. The paper 
thereby does not question or discuss the fundamental existence and idea of PSB 
in general.77 Discussing the legitimization of public service media provision 
online very often puts the general PSB system in question.78 However, it can be 
assumed that both, due to political and economic reasons, a complete abolition 
of the public service broadcasting system will not take place in the near future. 
Therefore, this paper takes the existing PSB system as given and unchangeable, 
                                                          
74  Though these two authors take the view that market failure arguments cannot be found on the inter-
net. 
75  Based on an empirical analysis of Germany, Switzerland and Austria. 
76  Who argues from a media economic perspective. 
77  For the general discussion of public service provision please refer to Armstrong (2005) Armstrong 
& Weeds (2007), Betzel & Ward (2004), Beyer & Beck (2009), Hargreaves Heap (2005), Harrison 
& Woods (2001), O’Hagan & Jennings (2003), Jakubowicz (2007), van Dijk et al. (2006), Ward 
(2006). 
78  At this point it shall be highlighted that I am not favoring the PSB system in the way it exists now. 
However, discussing this would go beyond the scope of this article. 
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waives to repeat the fundamental discussion of pros and cons of public service 
provision and instead concentrates specifically on cross-media effects that 
might result when having both online and offline offers provided by PSM. 
 
The following analysis discusses if there is an economic justification for having 
Public Service Media online. Within this, the chapter focuses on the aspects: 
existing infrastructure, competition, indirect network externalities, externalities 
and media bias. Thereby each section first argues from the point of view that 
supports a public service provision online before the contra arguments are dis-
cussed and hold up against it. 
4.2. The existing infrastructure and cross media effects as a justifica-
tion for PSM online? 
A fairly convincing argument for having PSM online could be the existing in-
frastructure; more precisely taking advantage of economies of scale and scope 
as well as resulting cross-media effects. As Ward (2006: 57) put it: “Publicly 
funded broadcasters […] must achieve size in order to maximize value for pub-
lic money and ensure public funding is invested efficiently in programming”.  
 
Public service broadcasting has been existent in Germany for many decades; 
thus the technical equipment, existing broadcasting programs and formats as 
well as people’s expertise and competencies are already available. Especially 
the latter ones can play a major role in this regard. The ARD and the ZDF, for 
example, have a fully developed correspondent network with experienced jour-
nalists from which they can make use for their online news as well. Especially 
in media markets which face high fixed costs and relatively low marginal costs 
this could play a significant role (Dewenter 2003: 4). Doyle (2002: 31) states in 
her book about Media Ownership that as soon as a media company grows, the 
more productive it can use its resources due to increasing economies of scale 
and economies of scope. That is, the higher the production gets, cost efficien-
cies can be achieved since average costs can be reduced (economies of scale). 
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This especially holds for websites and Depypere & Tigchelaar (2004: 20) em-
phasize that most of the production costs are already covered by the broadcast-
ing task of PSM. The same would hold for economies of scope – once content 
(e.g. news, information, education programs, documentaries) is produced it can 
easily and quite cheap be transmitted to other media types (Dewenter & Haucap 
2009b: 11). The process of researching and collecting information is done once 
but can be used manifold. This especially holds for products which are most 
closely related to each other with regard to production or distribution (Doyle 
2002: 40). A news program on television, for example, can be formatted for a 
website as well – either as a video-file, a podcast or a written article. Online 
media thereby gives a great advantage to do so since audio, video and textual 
elements converged on the internet. In particular economies of scope have quite 
an impact and are intensifying its impact in times of digitalization (Beyer & 
Beck 2008: 393; Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 11). This would mean that – 
through the interaction of economies of scale and economies of scope – the 
joint production of broadcasting (radio and television) and internet by PSM 
providers could result in a cheaper production than compared with the existence 
of a multitude of separate media companies (Doyle 2002: 34). A cheaper pro-
duction in turn would benefit the consumer if prices (here in the form of license 
fees) could thereby be reduced or at least kept constant while the benefits (addi-
tional media platform with content) increase. Albarran & Dimmick (1996: 43) 
refer to economies of multiformity – meaning the gain of efficiencies as soon as 
a company expands its operations cross-sectoral. With regard to PSM these 
economies of multiformity could hold as well since the company expanded 
cross-sectoral – from the initial radio and television sector towards the internet 
– and thereby used the existing infrastructure (Doyle 2002: 40f.). Thus taken 
the inevitable existence of their radio and television infrastructure as given it 
might seem reasonable to have a public service provision online as well. By 
taking advantage of the existing infrastructure, media formats and expertise 
they would produce more effective operations compared to the situation where 
a pure online supplier newly enters the market and needs to build up a complete 
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infrastructure and competencies from the scratch. This would in particular con-
cern people’s expertise and existing (correspondent) networks.  
 
Cross Media strategies could furthermore lead to more effective operations 
(Leurdijk 2007: 80). This would favor an extension of public service providers 
towards the internet; in other words not using their existing infrastructure could 
create sunk costs. By using the platforms television, radio and internet alto-
gether, however, public service providers could create synergies. Hills & 
Michalis (2000: 478f.) refer to synergies with respect to the distribution of con-
tent especially due to the ongoing process of convergence between broadcasting 
services and websites. Concretely, the authors argue in terms of programming 
(e.g. added-value to offline programs, new programs, thereby meeting the needs 
of minorities that cannot be done by broadcasts), packaging (e.g. add-on con-
tent) and transmission and access (e.g. gateway to other websites after a vetting 
process). In addition to this, further synergies can be gained through cross-
promotions. Budzinski & Wacker (2007: 298-302) talk about three different 
types of cross media strategies – price discrimination in cross-media advertis-
ing, content-related cross-promotion and cross-media advertising campaigns. 
Since – according to the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting – PSM websites are 
not allowed to finance their online programs over any form of advertising, pub-
lic service providers can only pursue a content-related cross-promotion strategy 
(Rundfunkstaatsvertrag 2009). With this strategy, the promotion takes place 
within the edited content (Budzinski & Wacker 2007: 299). Assuming that au-
diences online and offline are not 100% identical, this in turn would mean that 
further audiences for the respectively other media type can be won. Viewers of 
PSM programs on television, for example, could be attracted by a cross promo-
tion on television (e.g. in a news program) for a continuative discussion on a 
certain issue on the belonging website. The other way round users on PSM 
websites could, for example, be made aware of an interesting (political) pro-
gram that will be aired on television in the evening. In the end this could even 
result in an increased customer loyalty that would benefit the standing and im-
portance of PSM. By using cross-media strategies public service broadcasters 
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can also bring in a certain brand experience from their origin field of activity 
(Leurdijk 2007: 80). With concrete reference to Germany this would, for exam-
ple, hold for the established brand names Tagesschau and HEUTE – both initial 
news programs on the TV channels ARD and ZDF and meanwhile with an 
online presence as well.  
 
At this point it seems interesting what impact the expansion towards online and 
cross media strategies could have on consumer welfare. Very often, the argu-
ment is brought up that consumers have to pay license fee anyway which does 
not only hold for television and radio but (meanwhile) also when owning an 
internet capable computer (Schulz et al. 2008: 19).79 In that case consumers 
should also have the option to consume PSM content online – a platform they 
subsequently pay for (Frank & Meyerholt 2009: 374). Due to the inevitable ex-
istence of the PSB system the advantage for the consumer would be that he re-
ceives as many benefits as possible for paying license fees. It is not anymore 
just receiving a PSB provision on television and radio but additionally also on 
the internet. Secondly, by additionally operating online public service providers 
adapt to a changing media environment and follow their audience – by doing so 
adapting to changing or developing customer needs and habits – which in turn 
benefits the consumer. In general it can be observed that people in Germany 
nowadays do not use one media type exclusively. Instead, it is rather the com-
bined use of different types of media. The ARD/ZDF Online study 2009 showed 
that people in Germany, being online, still use various kinds of media types for 
consuming, for example news and information (van Eimeren & Frees 2009: 
343). Hence, it cannot be observed yet that people substitute television or radio 
towards the internet. A joint use of all these platforms seems reasonable. By us-
ing and transferring the existing experience and knowledge from the traditional 
broadcasting sector, PSM could better serve the citizens. Users could for exam-
                                                          
79  This argument, however, seems fairly unconvincing. That is because the decision to make citizens 
pay for internet capable computers (as a newly broadcasting device) was enforced down streamed 
after the expansion of PSM towards the internet. Nevertheless, the inevitable existence of the PSB 
system might give arguments in this regard.  
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ple, receive the same quality programs (e.g. news content) online that up to then 
could only be consumed on television and radio. Furthermore, cross media 
strategies could act as an information and orientation function for users. They 
can easily find out about suitable programs (search costs would decrease) and 
even find additional suitable programs they probably would not have consid-
ered otherwise. Hence, consumer preferences could be better matched.  
 
The existing infrastructure and economies of scale and scope indeed give good 
arguments for a legitimization of PSM online. However, the question is if these 
arguments (must) have its limits at some point – especially regarding the ongo-
ing expansion of public service activities online. First of all, high fixed costs 
have been lessened in times of new technologies and digitalization; they are not 
as high on the internet as once on television, costs for setting up the infrastruc-
ture decreased significantly (Beck 2005: 28f.; Beyer & Beck 2009: 83; Beyer & 
Carl 2008: 56). This in turn gives certain advantages to commercial companies 
who newly enter the market like pure online players – though they still lack 
knowledge, expertise or correspondent networks that were mentioned earlier. In 
addition to this, other existent media companies (e.g. publishing houses, com-
mercial broadcasters) profit from their existing infrastructure, like their exper-
tise or journalist networks as well. Consequently, economies of scale can be re-
alized in the same way as by public service broadcasters on the internet. Thus, 
in the online world it does not seem essential anymore to foster on just one (or 
few) providers which was probably advisable in times of analogue broadcasting 
and scarce frequencies. However, economies of scope indeed have an impact 
and are intensifying its impact in times of digitalization (Beyer & Beck 2008: 
393; Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 11). For example, once information has been 
collected and edited for a news program on television it can easily be trans-
ferred to other media types such as the internet. Thus, the inevitable existence 
of the PSB system would mean that economies of scale can be reached by PSM 
providers but not by pure online providers solely operating online. However, 
economies of scope can be realized in the same way by other existing media 
companies – like publishing houses that are online as well – and are not solely 
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limited to PSM providers. With regard to newspapers, for example, it holds as 
well that as soon as information is gathered and edited for the newspaper it can 
easily be transferred to the internet. Nevertheless, the transformation of content 
is always connected with some costs; particular adoptions are indispensable. On 
the one hand theses adoptions concern special requirements of the particular 
media type internet; on the other hand adoptions are necessary to meet the us-
ers’ needs which differ from the needs on television and radio.80 Another impor-
tant issue is the effect of a possible substitution. Even if it is possible and at first 
sight seems profitable to transfer all content from one media type to another 
(using economies of scope) the company always bears the risk that at some 
point users substitute medium A (e.g. the newspaper or news program of com-
pany x) towards medium B (e.g. the website of company x). In that case the 
demand would only be shifted from one medium to another instead of generat-
ing additional demand. Then, however, a shift of financial resources from 
broadcasting towards online would rather be advisable instead of an unlimited 
expansion online, as Beyer & Beck (2008: 397) suggest.  
 
In the first place it is public service broadcasters that profit from an online pres-
ence and possible resulting cost efficiencies. Also the consumer might face cer-
tain advantages that were already highlighted.81 However, does the consumer 
only profit from PSM online content? Their utility might be negative if the costs 
exceed the benefits. Though the consumer does not have to pay a direct price 
(paid content) for PSM websites it is not totally for free either. It always needs 
to be considered that each German citizen with a broadcasting capable equip-
ment is obliged to pay a monthly license fee of currently 5.76 Euro for radio 
and/or a newly broadcasting device,82 respectively 17.98 Euro if additionally in 
                                                          
80  The majority of existing media companies soon realized that the attempts of a 1:1 identical transfer 
from the initial media type towards the internet did not work but that adoption to the peculiarities of 
the internet were inevitable. 
81  The resulting negative effects on commercial competitors due to the existence of PSM providers 
online, however, will be the concrete issue in section 4.3.  
82  According to the GEZ a newly broadcasting device is a device that does not have a broadcasting re-
ceiver (e.g. a radio or TV card), however the reception of broadcasting is possible through new ways 
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possession of a television (GEZ83 online 2010a). As soon as consumers have to 
face higher costs for consuming additional content the effect on consumer wel-
fare is negative unless they receive benefits that exceed the costs. The KEF,84 
however, include a figure on their homepage85 that indicates that the license fee 
for public service broadcasting continuously increased throughout the last dec-
ades.86 The question now is, if the consumer with every single price increase re-
ceived a greater benefit out of the programs? In this respect, it even needs to be 
asked if PSM companies truly have incentives to work efficiently by using 
economies of scope and scale. After all, their financial resources are secured – 
§12 of the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting contain a financing guarantee 
(Bestands- und Entwicklungsgarantie)87 (European Commission 2007: 7; Hum-
phreys 1999: 25). Hence, due to their secured license fees public service pro-
viders in contrast to commercial ones do not necessarily have to consider costs 
in the first place. I would therefore suppose that commercial existing media 
suppliers who in the same way can realize economies of scale and scope from 
their traditional field of expertise (e.g. from the broadcasting or printed media 
sector) have greater incentives to realize cost efficiencies. 
 
To conclude, I suggest that an expansion of PSM providers towards online is 
legitimized to a certain point – against the background that the main infrastruc-
                                                          
of distribution or new receivers. This includes among others internet capable computers since they 
can show offers from the internet. The GEZ thereby does not restrict their description to broadcast-
ing content (e.g. audio and or video) only (GEZ online 2010b).   
83  Gebühreneinzugszentrale [License fee collecting agency]. 
84  Kommission zur Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs für Rundfunkanstalten [Commission for the deter-
mination of the financial requirements for the public service broadcasters]. 
85  http://www.kef-online.de/inhalte/entwicklung.html (05.07.2010). The figure thereby indicates the 
basic fee (for radio and nowadays newly broadcasting devices), the television fee and the total fee. 
86  This increase in the majority of cases also holds for the inflation-adjusted figures that I calculated 
from 1979 until 2009 with the exception of the price increase in 1988, 2005 (at least for the basic fee 
and the total fee whereas the television fee increased) and 2009. 
87  This financing guarantee was decided by the Constitutional Court in their 6th Broadcasting decision 
in 1991 (Lucht 2009: 26). 
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ture, expertise and competencies are existent anyhow. Nevertheless, this does 
not justify an unlimited spread online. An expansion seems to make sense only 
in areas where economies of scope and scale can truly be achieved and in turn 
cost savings are passed over to the citizen. Consumer welfare would increase 
either through decreased license fees or at least license fees that are kept con-
stant while receiving additional content benefits at the same time. An expansion 
to completely new programs, on the other hand, where cost efficiencies cannot 
be gained is from the viewpoint of the existing PSB system needless and inad-
visable. This could rather be left to the market. Nevertheless, in order to control 
public service providers in this regard and to check if interventions are success-
ful in reaching their desired objectives, appropriate measures to monitor PSM 
providers are indispensable as Hargreaves Heap (2005: 135f.) already con-
cluded for the television industry. 
4.3. Promotion or distortion of competition with PSM online? 
Another argument that could justify the presence of PSM online is the promo-
tion of competition. Therefore this section analyzes if – assuming the existing 
presence of the traditional PSB system – the expansion towards online is rather 
promoting or distorting competition. Bardoel & Lowe (2007: 16) state that pub-
lic service providers have to compete successfully in order to defend their le-
gitimacy and their license fee funding. The extension of PSM towards new me-
dia platforms and in particular the internet might therefore be a necessary step 
to follow the audience, by doing so staying competitive and in turn defending 
their justification. However, this should not go to the expense of competition in 
general. Before analyzing the impacts on competition it first of all needs to be 
considered that the internet market is a multisided market (see also section 
3.1.2). With regard to commercial media providers the media platform (pro-
vider of a certain website) serves two distinct demand sides simultaneously – 
the audience (users) and the advertising industry that is advertising on the web-
site. The distinct customer groups in turn influence each other through indirect 
network externalities which can be positive or negative (Dewenter 2006: 2). 
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This in turn influences the media platform’s behavior – more precisely their 
pricing, production, and investment strategies (Lindstädt 2010: 70).  
 
The expansion of PSM providers towards online activities at first sight pro-
motes competition. With their entrance there exists a multiplicity of new web-
sites in Germany (see section 3.1.1). Greater competition could thereby con-
tribute to more pluralism and diversity of opinion.88 In addition to this, greater 
competition also implies that competitive pressure within online media in-
creases which in turn leads to the situation that provider (public and commercial 
ones) have incentives to improve their existing products. Some authors fur-
thermore point out that PSM provider might create more innovation. Motta & 
Polo (1997: 298) – though with regard to public service television – highlight 
the uncertainty of potential revenues with regard to new and innovative pro-
grams. O’Hagan & Jennings (2003: 37f.) also see the risk that commercial 
players might not create enough innovative program whereas public service 
providers can since they are not preferential profit orientated. Consequently, 
there is a chance that PSM providers contribute to more innovation online. With 
license fees they have a secured income and hence do not have to cope with the 
uncertainty of potential revenues for innovative programs in the first run. Arm-
strong & Weeds (2007: 126) state that incentives for innovations with advertis-
ing-funded broadcasting are weak. This is because advertisers prefer to reach as 
many potential customers as possible (positive indirect network externality 
from users towards advertisers). However, innovative programs always bear the 
risk that not the mass audience but instead probably just a niche group is at-
tracted. Consequently, in order to please their advertisers and by doing so secur-
ing revenues commercial broadcasters might focus on mass-audience programs 
exclusively. It should be assumed that the same holds for online programs since 
advertising revenues play an even more important role on the internet – paid 
content hardly works which results in a great dependence on advertising reve-
nues. Hargreaves Heap (2005: 128) emphasizes this aspect and highlights that 
                                                          
88  Pluralism and diversity aspects will be further discussed in section 4.5. 
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building an audience requires more time with innovative programs. In the first 
run, commercial providers might not want to take the risk of innovating pro-
grams when taking the risk of not securing a large user base which in turn en-
dangers their advertising revenues. In the second run, however, innovation ef-
forts by public service providers might even spur commercial providers to pro-
duce innovative programs as well. This in turn would promote competition for 
innovation. With special regard to the inevitable existence of the traditional 
PSB system the existence might help PSM providers to better promote competi-
tion. More precise, their existing expertise and knowledge helps them on the 
one hand to contribute with similar existing programs from the broadcasting 
sector; on the other hand their expertise in inventing innovative programs for 
the broadcasting sector might help to contribute to innovation on the online sec-
tor as well. This in turn would spur commercial ones to increase their efforts in 
order to stay competitive. If innovation efforts, improved products – which can 
lead to better and cheaper products – and increased variety can truly be reached 
consumer welfare would increase as well and the presence of having PSM pro-
viders online would have a positive effect. 
 
Nevertheless, having PSM sites online could also create a risk of distorting 
competition. Armstrong (2005: 288) speaks of the danger of market distortion 
and inefficiencies – mainly due to the fact that PSM providers are publicly 
funded and rely on secured license fees. In the end this could even result in a 
reduction of pluralism or the risk that innovation is not ensured with having 
PSM providers – especially when they copy existing programs from the com-
mercial ones and crowd out commercial players. The financing guarantee might 
result in a lack of true incentives to contribute to pluralism and innovation. A 
distortion of competition in general has negative effects on consumer and pro-
ducer welfare and hence harms society. I will start with the effects on producers 
(commercial providers online): first of all it has to be considered that commer-
cial and public service providers do not compete under the same conditions due 
to their different forms of financing. Whereas commercial providers have to fi-
nance themselves mainly through advertising revenues public service providers 
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have their secured financing source. Prior to the existence of PSM online, both 
economic competition89 and editorial competition were already quite intense 
with pure commercial providers (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 12; Rebmann 
2003: 2f.). There is a great risk that the promotion of pluralism and innovation 
by commercial providers gets restricted if having too much PSM content online 
– especially in an area that up to then seemed to have worked being left to the 
market (Beyer & Beck 2008: 397). Thereby, the existence of the traditional 
PSB system might reinforce this effect. PSM providers could easily use their 
powerful position on the broadcasting market and transfer it to the online sec-
tor. They could even cross-subsidize online programs with license fees and ad-
vertising revenues90 they receive on their traditional platforms. Since public ser-
vice providers already have a powerful position on the broadcasting sector91 
they might rather focus to spend money on online activities in order to achieve 
an equivalent powerful position there as well. At the moment there are no limi-
tations on how much of their money public service providers have to spend on 
which media type.92 In addition to this, PSM online spending will account for 
491.58 Mio. Euro during the current period from 2009-2012 (KEF 2009: 125-
127). In comparison to the previous period 2005-2008 (online spending: 284.8 
Mio. Euro), public service broadcasters are therewith significantly expanding 
their spending for online activities.  
 
                                                          
89  This is especially due to the fact that high fixed costs have lessened in times of new technologies 
and digitalization and are not as high on the internet as once on television (Beck 2005: 28f.). Studies 
show, for example, that setting up a website on the internet is quite inexpensive (Dewenter & Hau-
cap 2009b: 22; Lindstädt 2007: 97) which facilitates the entrance of new competitors. 
90  Advertising is permitted to a certain extent for PSB on the broadcasting sector though the main 
source revenue is license fees. 
91  In May 2010 the public service broadcasting channels (ARD, ZDF, ARD III, 3sat, ARTE, KIKA, 
Phoenix) held a market share of 41.6% on the audience side. The RTL group at the same time held a 
market share of 26.5% and Pro7Sat1 a market share of 21.9% (KEK online 2010).  
92  For the current period 2009-2012 the public service broadcasters even waived their self-
commitment of limiting their online spending to 0.75% that was still valid for the previous period 
2005-2008 but was anyhow exceeded (actual online quotes: ARD: 0.86%, ZDF: 0.94%)  (KEF 
2009: 257f.). 
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Consequently, having PSM providers online could in worst case result in com-
mercial providers – assumingly smaller ones – being forced to leave the market. 
This could occur when the powerful PSM providers with their presence online 
draw users from smaller online platforms away. It would initially harm smaller 
providers. Since the internet market is a multisided market and due to the posi-
tive indirect network externalities that users exert on advertisers this negative 
effect would be reinforced. Due to fewer users on those platforms advertisers 
would most probably transfer their online spending to websites with a greater 
audience.93 Depending on the concrete effects, this could even go to such 
lengths that dominant positions on the market occur where some big commer-
cial websites and powerful PSM sites remain while smaller providers get 
crowded out. Due to blurring boundaries on the internet this distortion of com-
petition could thereby not only affect Germany’s online market and its provid-
ers but technically even harm companies from other countries.94 With regard to 
innovation, there is a risk that the existence of PSM sites could slow done inno-
vation attempts by commercial ones. Though the development of new programs 
got cheaper on the internet (compared to broadcasting) costs do incur. Whereas 
PSM providers do not have to regard the costs in first place, and even have the 
opportunity of cross-subsidization, the commercial ones have to do so. Ineffi-
cient cost strategies of public service providers could harm innovation efforts 
by commercial players. Burri-Nenova (2009: 16) on the contrary argues the 
other way around and highlights that new products will actually be provided by 
the market and refers to the great number of existing diverse media as well as 
consumer’s selection. From this point of view, it should be argued that com-
mercial providers in the same way are capable of bringing out innovative pro-
grams. This in turn diminishes the obligation of having PSM programs for se-
                                                          
93  Assuming homogenous websites and presuming multihoming, i.e. the use of different types of me-
dia at the same time to advertise on (nevertheless advertisers concentrate their multihoming rather 
on audience rich websites). 
94  In particular German speaking countries like Austria and Switzerland since (the majority of) Ger-
man websites (commercial & public service ones) are mainly in German language exclusively. 
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curing innovation online; instead having them could unnecessarily distort com-
petition.  
 
However, it is not only the commercial providers that would suffer from a dis-
tortion of competition. Also consumer welfare could get negatively affected. 
The effects would be negative if the initial increase in competition (more pro-
viders online) results in the contrary and smaller commercial providers would 
be forced to leave the market. In particular, if PSB takes advantage of its pow-
erful position in the broadcasting sector and cross-subsidizes their online pro-
grams. Pluralism and innovation efforts by commercial ones could decrease and 
negatively affect consumers. In addition to this, consumers would be harmed if 
PSM providers do not actually contribute to innovation (lack of incentives due 
to financing guarantee). If, however, they do contribute to innovation there is a 
risk that by doing so they aim for agency maximization (O’Hagan & Jennings 
2003: 38). PSB providers might have incentives at first to create a powerful po-
sition on the internet and secondly by doing that securing and extending their 
powerful position in general. By focusing on agency maximization (instead of 
profit maximization) they might lose sight of the costs and create cost ineffi-
ciencies. This, in turn, could make increased license fees necessary. If then 
quality and variety (Motta & Polo 1997: 314) do not outweigh this price in-
crease, consumer welfare would subsequently decrease. 
 
To conclude: It is true, as Wiedemann (2004: 15) put it, that a certain distortion 
of competition is unavoidable when having PSM providers online. Every en-
trance of new competitors change competition structures and might harm exis-
tent platforms to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the distortion of competition 
should be limited. In particular, it should not result in PSM providers transfer-
ring their powerful position from the broadcasting sector to their online plat-
forms just because they have the opportunity to do so due to secured license 
fees and the possibility of cross-subsidization. Furthermore, cost inefficiencies 
with the production of PSM programs must be avoided in order to not hinder 
commercial providers to make a contributing as well. Instead of offering the 
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same content as commercial providers, PSM providers should at most comple-
ment existing programs or formats (e.g. innovative programs) and by doing so 
use their existing expertise and competences from the broadcasting sector. In 
turn, this would additionally spur commercial providers and promote competi-
tion. All other areas, however, should be left to the market. It should be re-
garded counterproductive if PSM websites copy existing formats of commercial 
competitors. Those areas could and should be easily left to the competitive 
market – particularly by reason of not unnecessarily hinder efforts by commer-
cial providers and thus distort competition. The development of powerful posi-
tions of PSM on the internet should be prevented in order to countervail an 
augmented crowding out of commercial providers.  
4.4. Indirect network externalities favoring PSM online? 
It was stated in the previous section that media markets are multisided markets 
– indirect network externalities play a significant role. However, when looking 
at German PSM websites they are not allowed to finance their online programs 
over advertising. On first sight, therefore, it seems that indirect network exter-
nalities have no impact with regard to the question of the justification for PSM 
online. At second glance, however, network externalities appear to play a role. 
 
In fact, with regard to PSM platforms online we solely face one demand side – 
the users. Nevertheless, when analyzing competition structures online – includ-
ing commercial and public service providers – both demand sides come into 
play and get affected. The user and the advertising side are distinct demand 
sides, nevertheless they are connected to each other through indirect network 
externalities (Dewenter 2006: 2; Dewenter & Haucap 2009a: 36). Like in any 
other media type (e.g. newspaper, television) users always exert positive exter-
nalities on the advertising side (Dewenter 2007: 55). This is because companies 
who are placing advertising on media platforms appreciate to reach a preferably 
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large audience.95 Hence, the larger the number of participants on a certain web-
site, the more attractive it gets for the advertising side to place their ads there. 
For the user on the other hand the indirect network externalities that the adver-
tising side exerts on users are ambiguous – they can be positive or negative 
(Ferrando & Gabszewicz 2003: 1f). As long as users like or even appreciate ad-
vertising they would profit from a larger number of advertisers as well (positive 
indirect network externality). They would, for example prefer the website of a 
provider with a large number of advertisements due to receiving helpful infor-
mation that influence purchase decisions – in addition to consuming the actual 
media content. However, if users regard advertising as a nuisance the indirect 
network externality would be negative – the more advertising is aired on the 
corresponding website the fewer users would be willing to use it and rather pre-
fer websites with less or no advertising at all. Even though the answer – if fac-
ing positive or negative externalities – cannot be answered in a lump sum, the 
literature often expects that advertising on the internet in the majority of cases 
causes a more negative indirect network externality on users (Anderson & Gab-
szewicz 2006: 571).96 Popup-banners, for example, have to be clicked away and 
disturb the user in what he is currently doing whereas advertising in newspaper 
can be more easily skipped over. 
 
The question now is how these indirect network externalities interact with the 
existence of PSM sites online and how this in turn affects each demand side – 
users and advertisers as well as commercial competitors. If PSM providers op-
erate online it might have a positive effect on users. Due to the user’s assumed 
dislike of online advertising they now have the option to rather stick to PSM 
websites without advertising. Users could draw their attention away from com-
mercial websites (especially those with much annoying advertising) towards 
                                                          
95  However, and as mentioned in section 3.1.2, this audience for sure has to be consistent with the tar-
get group (customers or at least potential customers) to reach the superior goal of profit maximiza-
tion.  
96  Therefore the assumption for the following section is predominantly that the indirect network exter-
nality from the advertisers towards the users is negative.  
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PSM websites and thereby experience increased consumer welfare.97 Further-
more, since the financing of PSM websites is not at all dependant on advertising 
revenues their providers do not have to consider advertisers as a second demand 
side. Consequently, they can exclusively focus on their users’ interests (e.g. 
providing more minority programs rather than focusing on advertiser catching 
mass audience programs) which in turn would increase user’s welfare once 
more. With regard to advertisers as the second demand side, it was already 
stated that they appreciate websites with a large user base. One can assume, 
they would rather appreciate fewer providers online with larger user bases (lar-
ger network size) than many providers with smaller ones. At the moment com-
petition is quite intense online – many websites exist offering news and infor-
mation – thus users have a large choice and spread over a multitude of websites. 
This in turn could be suboptimal for advertisers – they face many websites with 
smaller user bases instead of fewer websites with larger amounts of users. Thus, 
in order to reach anyhow as many potential customers as possible they might be 
forced to advertise on a multitude of less audience rich websites instead of a 
few bigger ones – this, however, might increase costs (e.g. handling and trans-
action costs). At first glance, this could change with the existence of PSM web-
sites. First of all and as stated above, the existence of PSM sites could draw us-
ers away from certain commercial sites – on the one hand due to the dislike of 
advertising, on the other hand due to the fact of having an additional news pro-
vider (increased or better choice). For some commercial platforms the network 
size on the user side would consequently decrease. Due to positive network ex-
ternalities users exert on advertisers, the latter ones in turn would draw their ads 
away from the hitherto websites (with a decreasing user base) to websites with 
a larger user base in order reach more people (potential customers) with their 
advertising.98 Advertisers would subsequently try to center on platforms that 
possess high(er) amounts of users. By doing so they might experience a greater 
welfare. Though they had to face transaction costs when changing the platform 
                                                          
97  On the contrary: In case that consumers regard advertising as a positive measure, for example 
through receiving helpful information, welfare for consumers on PSM websites would decrease.  
98  Smaller providers would not only loose users but at second step also advertisers. 
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they might now have less handling and management costs through advertising 
on a smaller amount of websites. Assuming negative indirect network external-
ities from advertisers towards users the latter ones might probably experience a 
benefit as well. There might be some websites with more advertising than oth-
ers, thus disturbing advertising might be easier to avoid.99 At this point, how-
ever, it has to be considered that commercial platforms with less advertising 
need to finance their sites over other sources of income. Paid content (paid by 
the user) might increase on those websites and might lead to decreasing welfare 
if benefits do not outweigh the costs. 
 
Nevertheless, these assumptions are rather optimistic and neglect certain cir-
cumstances. First of all, these arguments imply that both advertisers and users 
singlehome – i.e. use one website to consume or advertise on exclusively. This 
premise however seems fairly unrealistic. Both demand sides rather multihome 
(using a multitude of websites). The advertising industry almost always multi-
homes – both intermedial that is on different media types, (e.g. internet and 
television) and intramedial that is on different platforms (e.g. websites) within 
one media type (here the internet) (Chyi & Sylvie 1998: 4-12; Lindstädt 2010: 
96). By doing so companies try to maximize their media coverage, i.e. try to 
reach as many (potential) customers as possible. Moreover, the audience can 
and does multihome as well. The majority of consumers stick to different web-
sites and different media types in addition to the internet. Secondly, the need for 
advertisers to switch to more frequented platforms is always connected with 
transaction costs. They have to be proportionate to the benefits the advertiser 
achieves. In this context, it furthermore needs to be considered that the size of 
the user base is not the only selection criteria; instead quality criteria become 
more important. In addition to this, even if fewer platforms to advertise on are 
assumed, it always means that those platforms have a larger margin to set their 
prices. In worst case the movement from advertisers to audience-rich sites could 
                                                          
99  However, depending on the strength of network externalities there might be a feedback loop. If 
smaller platforms (now with less advertising) get more users again, also the attractiveness for adver-
tisers might increase again.  
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thus lead to concentration tendencies; big commercial media platforms could 
take a dominant position on the advertising market which harms advertisers. 
Thereby, PSM online providers could not even counter steer against this trend 
since they are not allowed to include advertising. In the end this would result in 
higher costs for advertisers to pay for their adverts online. Taking a look at the 
effects on commercial providers: due to the commercial providers’ high de-
pendence on advertising revenues the existence of PSM sites could even result 
in smaller commercial platforms being forced to leave the market (due to drift-
ing away users in first place and drifting away advertisers in second place) or to 
charge for content. This in turn could have a reinforcing effect on the user side 
– they might face decreased pluralism (incl. innovation and diversity) if com-
mercial providers exit the market or as stated above might have to face paid 
content on certain commercial sites.  
 
The analysis of PSM’s online presence on indirect network externalities up to 
now did not specifically take the existing broadcasting system into account. 
However, when taking a closer look it gets clear that this existence does not 
change the above stated argumentation. By asking for an economic justification 
for PSM online with regard to indirect network externalities it does not seem to 
make a difference if the traditional broadcasting system does exist or not. This 
mainly has to do with the fact that PSM websites are not allowed to contain ad-
vertising. The existence of PSB (radio and television) would probably become 
considerable if online advertising was allowed for PSM providers. Therefore, it 
would be important for PSM providers to be able to transfer their existing 
broadcasting audience to their own websites. Their established reputation and 
quality might indeed convince the audience to use the belonging online offers. 
In that case public service providers could make use of the positive indirect 
network externality that viewers (or listeners) exert on advertisers. Having a 
big(ger) network size on the user side would make this platform attracting to 
advertisers. In that case, at least advertisers might profit. However, this does not 
yet consider the impact on users and commercial providers which I assume 
would be rather negative: on the one hand the negative indirect network exter-
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nality for users due to their expected dislike of advertising and on the other 
hand the negative effect on commercial providers due to drifting away advertis-
ers. 
 
To conclude, with regard to indirect network externalities it would at the most 
be users who profit from the existence of PSM websites – mainly due to adver-
tising-free content and possibly getting more minority programs. For the adver-
tising side on the other hand the effects of having PSM online would rather be 
negative especially with regard to the risk of facing harmful concentration ten-
dencies on the advertising market of the commercial platforms. Furthermore, if 
the existence of PSM websites results in less – especially smaller – commercial 
providers (crowding out) it could in turn have a negative impact on consumers. 
They could suffer from decreased choices, hence less pluralism which would 
result in decreased user welfare and outweigh the positive effect on users in the 
first place. The inevitable existence of the traditional broadcasting system 
thereby does not change the above discussed effects.100  
4.5. Externality reasons justifying PSM online? 
The traditional form of public service broadcasting has to a large part been ar-
gued on the basis of risking market failure when not intervening into the mar-
ket. In the same way as the broadcasting industry the internet is oftentimes ac-
cused of being an industry with a great risk of market failure. However, many 
authors do not see market failure arguments – due to monopoly power, public 
goods, information asymmetries or externality reasons – to be anymore existent 
in the digital era and hence on the internet.101 As Armstrong & Weeds (2007: 
                                                          
100  However, it could be interesting to further analyze if in total positive effects could result from per-
mitting PSM providers to include advertising online. This, however, would go beyond the scope of 
this paper and demand for further research. 
101  As already stated in the introduction, this article waives to repeat the fundamental discussion of pros 
and cons of the public service provision and, instead, concentrates on the specific cross-media ef-
fects. For a detailed argumentation why market failure arguments do not hold anymore in the digital 
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82) put it: “[…] digital broadcasting greatly mitigates traditional market failures 
and, in this context, the market will give people broadly what they want to 
watch. In this sense, the ‘market failure’ basis for public service broadcasting 
falls away”. 
 
Notwithstanding, other authors still argue with externality reasons as a remain-
ing rationale for having PSM in the digital era (e.g. Bardoel & Lowe 2007: 14; 
van Dijk et al. 2006: 274f.). In media markets externalities are quite often ob-
served since information is regarded to present a dual value (Dewenter & Hau-
cap 2009b: 10). On the one hand media have an effect directly on the person 
who is consuming content. On the other hand content then also has a second ef-
fect on society. If a person watches a particular program (thereby learning about 
life saving skills, for example) this could have an impact on the wider popula-
tion (that person is probably capable of (better) coping with a future emergency 
situation) that the person did not consider when watching the program (Arm-
strong 2005: 289). In order to have positive effects on society the aim is to 
promote positive externalities (benefits) while limiting or preventing negative 
ones (costs) (Armstrong & Weeds 2007: 109). Hargreaves Heap (2005: 125-
127) speak of horizon-stretching programs which contribute to positive exter-
nal effects – first to the individual and secondly to society. Thus, externality 
reasons could legitimize the presence of PSM online, especially with regard to 
the fact that the traditional form of PSB, including present programs, expertise 
and competences are anyhow existent. Positive externalities (e.g. providing cer-
tain educational programs) that are generated on television and radio can be 
transferred and used online as well (cross media effects). By doing so, cost effi-
ciencies could be reached since the transfer and adaption of an existing broad-
casting program to the online requirements should be cheaper than the produc-
tion of a fully new program for the internet. To illustrate with an example: 
documentations or an educational program on television could be adapted to a 
                                                          
era and on the internet please refer to Armstrong & Weeds (2007), Beyer & Beck (2008 & 2009), 
Depypere & Tigchelaar (2004), Dewenter & Haucap (2009b), Donders & Pauwells (2008). 
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short video-file on the corresponding website. Furthermore, the once collected 
information for the program can be used to create an article or even a special 
edition on this topic.  
 
According to Leurdijk (2007: 83) PSM online could produce public value, es-
pecially by giving universal access, ensuring quality standards as well as edu-
cating the audience in digital skills. By doing so, they would furthermore work 
against fragmentation and enclosure of information and create social cohesion 
on the internet (Bardoel & Lowe 2007: 20; Karppinen 2009: 164). This is cru-
cial online – an area where users can easily decide on their own what content to 
consume – this risks that they just watch what interests and confirms their own 
beliefs (Karppinen 2009: 161f.). Having programs and content with high quality 
online would as well promote positive externalities. With special regard to qual-
ity, van der Wurff (2007: 108) states that in certain areas like news and infor-
mation quality cannot rely on market forces alone. Going one step further, the 
existence of PSM online could thereby even be regarded as a reprehension 
function for commercial providers online, for example in the form of quality in-
surance how O’Hagan & Jennings (2003: 38) already stated for the broadcast-
ing market. PSM sites could fulfill a monitoring and signaling function; their 
quality content would bring commercial providers to provide quality as well. 
Here, again, the advantage of having the inevitable existence of the traditional 
public service broadcasting system becomes apparent. For the broadcasting sec-
tor it is often argued that having a public service broadcasting system with a 
special credibility that is providing diversity and pluralism is also responsible 
for the little conditions that are demanded from the private broadcasting sector 
(Beyer & Carl 2008: 53; Moe 2009: 190; Trappel 2008: 314). If this is the case, 
PSM providers could on the one hand transfer their existing quality programs to 
the online sector. On the other hand they already have competence and experi-
ence in reprehending and monitoring; consequently they could easily transfer 
and use these knowledge also on the internet. In that case, the inevitable exis-
tence of the traditional PSB system would save costly set-up costs as well as 
costly learning periods that would be necessary for commercial providers – es-
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pecially those who newly enter the market. Closely connected to this, PSM sites 
could thereby additionally give the user orientation in an area where the infor-
mation flood is enormous (Rüter 2002: 144). Furthermore some researchers 
also subsume innovation as well as promoting media pluralism and cultural di-
versity under the externality argument (e.g. Donders & Pauwells 2008: 297; 
Hargreaves Heap 2005: 137, 141; Murdock 2004: 17f.; van Dijk et al. 2006: 
252). 
 
If subsuming those aspects under the externality argument, this area is to my 
point of view closely connected with the merit good reasoning. As stated in sec-
tion 2.1.2 merit goods are those goods that are important to society, which how-
ever, people consume to a lesser extent than is good for them and are not pro-
vided by the market at all or just with many difficulties (Moe 2009: 190; Robin-
son et al. 2005: 108). For this reason it is argued that people who know what is 
good for society (e.g. the government) first of all decide on classifying merit 
goods and subsequently offer those kinds of goods the consumers (public provi-
sion) for a reduced price (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 4f.). In the broadcasting 
industry this is especially assumed for certain programs like news, documenta-
ries or educational programs (Robinson et al. 2005: 108).102 Media indeed have 
a public function, they transfer information and knowledge while at the same 
shaping public opinion which is particularly valid for news (Anderson & Gab-
szewicz 2006: 569; Beck 2005: 15). Thus, PSM could also online fulfill the 
function of providing merit goods. Among others this includes the assurance of 
minority programs, thereby serving all citizens, promoting to pluralism (cultural 
diversity and diversity of opinion) and not just focus on mass audiences exclu-
sively. These areas might not sufficiently be served by commercial markets 
(Bardoel & d’Haenens 2008: 343). Again, due to the two-sidedness of the inter-
net market media companies might be tempted to focus on mass audiences only 
since they in turn guarantee a better perception towards the advertising industry. 
Providing minority (e.g. cultural programs) and niche programs (e.g. special 
                                                          
102  Ward (2006: 62) even argues with market failure with respect to the lack of providing certain goods 
that benefit society. 
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news programs) might therefore be neglected by commercial providers since 
they do not seem profitable (Moe 2009: 190). Consequently, it might be reason-
able to have PSM providers online to fill this gap. They should be offering con-
tent and programs that aim at specific minority groups or even geographical re-
gions not met by the commercial ones (Aslama 2008: 20; Hills & Michalis 
2000: 479). In particular the consequential contribution to pluralism is high-
lighted by authors who are supporting PSM online. It is the importance of plu-
ralism and cultural diversity to contribute to democracy and cultural citizenship 
(Hills & Michalis 2000: 477, Leurdijk 2007: 71; Murdock 2004: 18). Aslama 
(2008: 20) and Syvertsen (2003: 161) furthermore highlight fostering culture 
and protecting national and regional identity in times of globalization. This 
could especially be an important issue on the internet where boundaries are 
blurring. This paper’s assumption of the inevitable existence of the traditional 
public service broadcasting system might give good reasons that this task 
should be better taken over by PSM than commercial players. Contributing to 
pluralism and cultural diversity is already their task on radio and television. 
Consequently, the expertise and knowledge that was gained in this field can be 
transferred and used for the online sector as well. This could concretely apply to 
minority or niche programs that are either fairly similarly transferred (e.g. short 
video file) or adapted to other formats. The built up reputation of PSB (e.g. re-
garding quality) could take over a signaling function and convince people to 
consume PSM online content as well. Moreover, PSM providers could take the 
position of monitoring and reprehending commercial players. 
 
The question is, however, why it necessarily has to be PSM providers who gen-
erate positive externalities, limit negative ones and contribute with merit 
goods103 to society. Motta & Polo (1997: 296, 321-323) though with regard to 
public television, emphasize that the justification for minority programs might 
be overcome through the opening of the markets and argue for public service 
provision in areas where pluralism of opinions is put in danger and with a focus 
                                                          
103  The arising problematic questions with merit goods were already highlighted in section 2.1.2. 
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on programs that are otherwise not offered by commercial ones. Hargreaves 
Heap (2005: 146f.) even regards diversity arguments in times of a multi-
channel era dispensable. Barriers of entry are fairly low, thus competition 
online is quite intense104 and hence favors pluralism (Depypere & Tigchelaar 
2004: 21; Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 24; Rebmann 2003: 3). Thus, also com-
mercial providers could and do make a contribution with goods that are desir-
able for the society (e.g. quality,105 minority and innovation programs). As 
stated in section 4.3, new products will actually be provided by the market due 
to a great number of existing diverse media as well as consumer’s selection 
(Burri-Nenova 2009: 16). Also programs do exist which are contributing, for 
example, to the education of society – not least because there is demand for it 
(Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 19). Furthermore, with (intense) competition a 
media company has no incentive to provide worse quality since consumers 
could easily switch to competitors. Competition has as a monitoring function; 
thus monitoring the providers on the market could also be taken over by compe-
tition itself. In this regard it might be even sufficient that PSB is taking a repre-
hension and monitoring function on the traditional broadcasting sector exclu-
sively instead of expanding towards online. Furthermore, Range & Schweins 
(2007: 7f.) found out that with many publishing houses, where the traditional 
product newspaper is regarded to have a high journalistic quality also their 
online websites are said to be journalistically discerning. This argument is 
closely connected with reputation – media are usually not consumed once but 
on a regular basis. As soon as something is consumed frequently, reputation is 
                                                          
104  Traditional broadcasting suppliers (television and radio), providers from the printed media industry 
(newspapers and magazines) as well as pure online players can be found – offering media content 
online. 
105  Another interesting aspect brought up by Motta & Polo (1997: 323) – though with regard to public 
television – is that quality reasons do not necessarily demand for a public service provision. Instead, 
it could be the production of quality content that is taken over by public service agencies whereas 
the distribution takes place over private channels – this would also give the private suppliers enough 
incentives to provide high quality (ibid). In principal, it has to be anyhow asked what quality is. It is 
not really possible to measure “quality” (Hargreaves Heap 2005: 146). Judging quality will to some 
point always be subjective. 
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built up; hence it can be expected that no media company has an incentive to 
lose its good reputation by providing non-quality content (Beyer & Beck 2008: 
392f.).  
 
Going one step further and taking the powerful position of public service pro-
viders into consideration it could even be argued that the existence of PSM 
websites limits and restricts commercial players to enfold their true attempts 
(e.g. regarding quality and minority programs) which might hinder them to con-
tribute to pluralism and diversity. They might not be able to compete with PSM 
providers, mainly due to the different form of financing and therefore decide to 
not produce such programs at all. PSM providers thereby have the advantage of 
the secured license fee on the one hand but also the opportunity of cross-
subsidization on the other hand. The initial advantage of the existing PSB sys-
tem might soon become a problem – at first for commercial competitors (being 
forced to waive the production of certain programs) and secondly for users as 
well (decreasing pluralism and diversity). Consequently, it is not only the risk 
of distortion of economic competition that was discussed in section 4.3 but also 
a distortion of quality competition. 
 
A quite crucial argument that especially holds for the internet is, if public ser-
vice provision really achieves the desired effect. It needs to be seriously ques-
tioned if it is efficient to intervene in media markets by providing goods that the 
consumer should consume, but otherwise would not consume? Subsequently, 
the digital world makes it possible that people avoid unappealing public service 
programs (Armstrong 2005: 284, 290).106 Against this background it need to be 
doubted that the existence of PSM online actually helps working against frag-
mentation, individualization and the enclosure of information or even fostering 
culture and national identity. The same holds for the claimed orientation func-
tion. This would mean that the user directly navigates to a PSM site when look-
ing for something in particular. However, it seems rather the search engine sites 
                                                          
106  Once the television market was still a monopoly the availability of TV-channels was limited, how-
ever, it was possible to get people to watch desired programs (Armstrong 2005: 290). 
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(e.g. google) that determine which particular websites users visit; hence it 
would be fairly them who provide orientation at most (Karppinen 2009: 159). 
Thus, even if PSM sites include appropriate measures on their websites to 
achieve the mentioned desirable effects, it would require ensuring that users ac-
tually visit those sites and consume the desired content. In the end, however, 
consumers cannot be forced to consume information from PSM sites. The inter-
net is bringing the consumer from a fairly passive to an active role – users surf 
to sites that provide what they are looking for and not anymore the other way 
round (Prado & Fernandez 2006: 52). In contrast to the traditional mass media 
types the internet can therefore be characterized as a lean-forward medium (van 
Eimeren & Frees 2006: 412).107 Karppinen (2009: 152) characterize it as a de-
mand and search driven media environment. Positive effects (e.g. positive ex-
ternalities) therefore can only be promoted if people actively visit PSM web-
sites. Then, however, the question is which audience actually consumes PSM 
content? According to van der Wurff (2007: 112-114) studies show that espe-
cially higher educated audiences use a variety of media whereas lower educated 
ones rather stick to television and within this focus on commercial channels. In 
that regard a public service provision should even be regarded counterproduc-
tive; it then benefits those audiences that probably would be willed to pay a 
(higher) price for those programs. Hence, the cross-subsidization would go into 
the wrong direction. Consequently, van der Wurff (2007) concluded that PSM 
online should focus on lower educated audiences whereas serving the higher 
educated ones could be left to the market. However, again, this seems fairly im-
possible when users cannot be forced to watch desirable content. It gets even 
more complicated with regard to preventing or limiting negative externalities. 
Nearly everybody can broadcast on the internet and people can consume any 
content available on the World Wide Web due to blurring national boundaries 
(Karppinen 2009: 155; van Dijk et al. 2006: 254, 275). Users face boundless 
possibilities, the next website is just a click away. Consequently, even if public 
service websites limit or prevent negative externalities (e.g. violent programs) it 
                                                          
107  Whereas television and radio are regarded as lean-back media (van Eimeren & Frees 2006: 412). 
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cannot be assured that no violent program is shown or watched on the internet 
at all. As Hargreaves Heap (2005: 139) puts it: “If the source of a market failure 
is something on the demand side, like the possible negative externalities associ-
ated with watching excessively violent programmes, then in a multi-channel 
world there is little or no sense in addressing this problem through a targeted 
supply side intervention [...]”.  
 
To conclude: promoting positive externalities while limiting negative ones 
seems hardly impossible online. Nevertheless, against the background that the 
traditional form of PSB exists, promoting positive externalities online should be 
allowed for PSM providers where possible. Content can fairly easily be trans-
ferred from broadcasting to online and furthermore be used manifold; conse-
quently cross media effects (e.g. cost efficiencies) can be achieved. By doing so 
PSM would in turn contribute to pluralism and diversity. Nevertheless, as al-
ready concluded in section 4.3, the extent of PSM activities should be limited to 
areas that are not yet offered to a large scale by commercial players but instead 
on complementing offers. PSM online should not follow the goal of producing 
mass audience programs. Instead it is completely legitimate to reaching just 
niche groups with minority programs.108 By doing so, it could furthermore be 
ensured that PSM is not exploiting its powerful position towards the internet 
and thus that commercial platform attempts to generate positive externalities 
and to contribute to pluralism and diversity does not get unnecessarily hindered 
or restricted. 
4.6. The need for PSM online for media bias reasons? 
As stated in section 2.1 media can be characterized by a dual media effect; that 
is media transfer information and knowledge while at the same time being a 
factor of building up public opinion (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 569; 
Wentzel 2002: 2). A convincing argument for PSM websites online could there-
                                                          
108  This however, requires in turn the understanding that PSM’s success should not be measured ac-
cording to audience figures and quotas. 
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fore be to ensure non-biased information.109 Biased information became more 
critical with the emergence of the internet. It is nowadays not only the risk of 
biased information from providers within national boundaries, for example 
Germany. Blurring national boundaries on the internet make the problem of bi-
ased information from all over the world an essential issue. The bias could oc-
cur from two different sides. It can be caused by users itself who express opin-
ions and distribute information on forums or own websites. As Karppinen 
(2009: 153) puts it, citizens nowadays compete with journalists on the produc-
tion and distribution of political information which makes it harder to control 
what is regarded as news. On the other hand the bias could result from media 
providers – in particular the commercial ones. Media bias is a fairly broad area 
and coping with all forms of media bias would go beyond the scope of this pa-
per.110  
 
Therefore, this section focuses on a particular form of media bias – the biased 
reporting towards advertisers. This bias is closely connected to the two-
sidedness of the internet market. As it was stated earlier, the majority of reve-
nues from commercial websites come from advertisers which imply a high de-
pendence on them. If a big advertising client draws his adverts away it could se-
riously harm the accordant media platform. It could therefore be tempting for 
                                                          
109  This for sure depends on the organization of the public service system and in this case concretely re-
fers to Germany. In Germany the public service system is organized in a way without political influ-
ence. Therefore, the danger of biased reporting should be relatively low (though a 100% unbiased 
reporting should even here be not realistic. In the end no media can ensure to report totally unbiased 
– neither commercial nor public service ones). However, in countries were the political and gov-
ernmental influence is very high or the public service system is even state-owned (e.g. China) the 
risk of biased reporting from public broadcasting systems should be regarded as quite high and se-
vere. In the latter case it might rather be the commercial providers that would have incentives to 
provide unbiased information in order to counter steer the political biased reporting of state owned 
media companies. 
110  Regarding media bias in general there is no clear consensus among researchers if it is competition or 
concentration tendencies that lead to more biased media coverage. For a short literature overview of 
recent works dealing with the issue of media bias please refer to Lindstädt (2010: 77-79). To my 
point of view, this general discussion on media bias is furthermore difficult to separate accurately 
with the discussion of externality reasoning (see section 4.5). 
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online media operators to not report in a negative way about a company that is 
simultaneously an important advertising client. According to van der Wurff 
(2007: 108) markets fail in areas of news and information since independence 
and quality cannot be assured by the market only. Thus, a PSM provision on the 
internet could be helpful – at least in certain areas. Lambert (2007: 62f.) con-
cretely sees the function of public service providers to offer balanced and com-
prehensive news reporting. In the same way Bardoel & d’Haenens (2008: 343) 
see the need for public service provision in order to provide reliable informa-
tion, and also van Dijk et al. (2006: 274) especially point out the areas of news 
and opinion. PSM providers on the internet might indeed represent a helpful 
complementation of existing offers in order to balance or even avoid biased re-
porting towards advertisers. First of all, PSM websites are not allowed to con-
tain any form of advertising on their websites – thus the problem of biased re-
porting towards advertisers is no issue. This in turn might balance a possible 
bias resulting from advertising financed online media. Secondly, PSM websites 
would thereby take a reprehension and monitoring function. The purely exis-
tence of unbiased PSM sites bears the risk that a possible biased reporting from 
commercial players could immediately be detected by consumers. As a conse-
quence, consumers would drift away from those websites and the affected 
commercial provider might lose reputation it has built up before. Thus, the in-
centives for commercial suppliers to bias certain information might decrease. 
The inevitable existence of the traditional broadcasting system might reinforce 
the advantage of having unbiased PSM websites. Public service providers can 
transfer their experience and expertise they have gained on the traditional 
broadcasting sector in taking over a monitoring and reprehension function in 
this regard towards the online sector.111 The reputation that public service pro-
viders have built up on the television and radio sector represents a further ad-
vantage. It could be transferred to PSM websites as well and thus work as a sig-
naling function for users. 
                                                          
111  Even though public service providers are allowed to contain a certain amount of advertising the risk 
of biased reporting towards advertisers should be regarded quite low since the majority of revenue is 
gained over license fees which lessens the dependence on advertising revenues.  
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However, the question is, if the risk of biased information is that serious in or-
der to legitimize public service providers to operate on the internet. First of all, 
it has to be considered that biased information can differ regarding their impact 
on society. Not any biased information has the same negative impact on users. 
For example, biased reporting within the celebrity section of a website assum-
ingly has a less significant impact then a biased reporting about a sensible in-
ternational political matter. Van der Wurff (2007: 108) highlighted in particular 
areas of news and information and did not refer to all fields of content. 
Dewenter & Haucap (2009b: 24) put an even more narrow emphasis – on those 
areas that have a high political and societal relevance where furthermore a bi-
ased reporting cannot easily and immediately being observed by users. Apart 
from that, both reputation as well as competition hold against biased reporting – 
if they work well public service provision can be limited (Beyer & Beck 2008: 
392; van Dijk et al. 2006: 274). Media providers that have built up a good repu-
tation online would assumingly have no incentives to risk this reputation only to 
keep an advertising client. Furthermore, existing media companies operating 
online can in the same way take advantage of transferring their good reputation 
from their original media platform towards the internet. Hence the above stated 
advantage is not limited to PSM providers. According to Rebmann (2003: 2) 
many newspapers transfer their reputation and reliability towards online. In ad-
dition to this, users most probably will find out fairly soon about this biased re-
porting since most people multihome and not use one media platform exclu-
sively. As a result they might drift to competitors to avoid unbiased reporting. 
Moreover, and as stated in section 4.5, competition itself has a monitoring func-
tion (Dewenter & Haucap 2009b: 20). Companies monitor each other; if there is 
a competitor that would provide false or biased information, other companies 
would leverage this by drawing customers away to their own websites.  
 
To conclude: Commercial media companies’ incentives to bias information 
should be quite low with intense competition – which is the case on the internet 
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–the risk to lose their reputation and users’ multihoming.112 A PSM offer on the 
internet should at the utmost be legitimized with regard to complementing offers 
– thereby in areas with a fairly high political and societal value where the iden-
tification of a possible bias is fairly difficult for users, as Dewenter & Haucap 
(2009b: 24) suggested. Thereby, the inevitable existence of the traditional PSB 
system could be helpful. The already built up reputation can be transferred to 
their websites and work as a signaling function for users. Furthermore, the ex-
isting expertise and experience with taking over a reprehension and monitoring 
function on the broadcasting sector in this regard can be transferred to the 
online sector as well. Apart from those mentioned areas it is, however, without 
much doubt that mechanisms like reputation of commercial providers, competi-
tion and users’ multihoming work against biased reporting. 
5. Conclusion 
Many researchers have already dealt with the very controversial topic of PSM 
online and the question if they should have a legitimization online and if so to 
which extent. No paper, however, up to now analyzed this question against the 
background of the inevitable existence of the traditional PSB system and possi-
ble resulting cross media effects. It was the aim of this article to fill this gap. 
The analysis has shown that there is a certain justification for having PSM 
online especially due to their gained expertise and competencies that might be 
transferred to their corresponding websites. Nevertheless, the paper concluded 
that PSM should not expand unlimited; in particular the expansion of their al-
ready existent powerful position should be prevented. The internet and digitali-
zation in general have changed the media environment and things once possible 
on broadcasting (e.g. making people watch desirable content) cannot be ensured 
on the internet anymore. For this reason, it is reasonable to use the existing in-
                                                          
112  In addition to this, it must be questioned if it can be totally ensured having unbiased information on 
PSM sites. As stated earlier, no media can ensure to report totally unbiased – neither private nor 
public ones. However, this question would lead into the general discussion of media bias which 
would go beyond the scope of this paper.  
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frastructure, in particular expertise and competencies to produce content where 
cost efficiencies can be gained which in turn benefits consumers. In this regard, 
the remaining rationale should lie in the complementation of commercial pro-
grams (e.g. minority programs) in order to contribute to more pluralism and di-
versity. With regard to preventing biased information the focus should be on ar-
eas where the risk of advertising biased information has an impact on society 
(in particular news areas). All other areas, however, should be left to the market 
in order to not unnecessarily hinder accordant efforts by commercial providers, 
thus risk an unnecessary distortion of competition which in turn would entail 
negative effects on consumers.  
 
82 
6. Appendix 
Rank Title Online Media Visits 
(in Mio. per year) 
Market Share 
(of Top 20 in %) 
1 Spiegel Online 1,327 20.33 
2 Bild.de 1,196 18.32 
3 Chip Online 564 8.64 
4 Kicker Online 345 5.28 
5 Heise Online 310 4.75 
6 Sport1.de 294 4.5 
7 Focus online 281 4.3 
8 Sueddeutsche.de 270 4.16 
9 Welt.de 265 4.06 
10 n-tv Online 232 3.55 
11 FAZ.net 215 3.3 
12 Stern.de 194 2.98 
13 Computerbild.de 184 2.82 
14 PC-Welt 173 2.66 
15 N24 Online 146 2.24 
16 Zeit online 128 1.97 
17 Handelsblatt.com 116 1.77 
18 Rp-online 102 1.56 
19 FTD.com 99 1.51 
20 Finanzen.net 88 1.35 
Top 20 News portals of the Year 2009, source: own graph according to BITKOM 2010 online. 
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